14 Cooperation
Handley Abstract
A fundamental puzzle of human evolution is how we evolved to cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers in transient interactions. Group-level selection on culturally differentiated populations is one proposed explanation. We evaluate a central untested prediction of Cul- tural Group Selection theory, by assessing whether readiness to cooperate between indivi- duals from different groups corresponds to the degree of cultural similarity between those groups. We documented the normative beliefs and cooperative dispositions of 759 indivi- duals spanning nine clans nested within four pastoral ethnic groups of Kenya—the Turkana, Samburu, Rendille and Borana. We find that cooperation between groups is predicted by how culturally similar they are, suggesting that norms of cooperation in these societies have evolved under the influence of group-level selection on cultural variation. Such selection acting over human evolutionary history may explain why we cooperate readily with unrelated and unfamiliar individuals, and why humans’ unprecedented cooperative flexibility is never- theless culturally parochial.
We conclude that group-level selection on cultural variation has likely left a mark on the human cooperative psychology and continues to influence which social norms and institutions prevail in human societies.
Handley (2020) Human large-scale cooperation as a product of competition between cultural groups (pdf)
14.0.1 The benefits of Cooperation
Peters (see also ecsb/ergodicity)
This innocuous-looking gamble is a powerful tool, a window affording us a rather different view of economics, ecology, evolution, and complexity science.
(Simulator in post)
This coin toss is taunting us — it has that wonderful expected value, increasing exponenti ally, and yet when we play it, we’re bound to lose. Isn’t there some trick we can apply? S ome way of harvesting something of those great expectations, carrying over the promise fro m the statistical ensemble into the individual trajectory?
The answer is yes — and that’s one reason why ergodicity economics has become such a hot t opic. There’s a very simple cooperation protocol which allows us to benefit from the coin toss. Here it is: find a partner, independently play one round each, then pool your wealth and split it evenly. Then play the next round independently.
With the parameters of the gamble, pairing up in this way leads to a time-average growth r ate of the wealth of the cooperating pair of -0.2% per round, compared to -5% per round fo r the individual player — the cooperators outperform the non-cooperators exponentially and almost break even. With one extra cooperator applying the same protocol — play independen tly, pool wealth, share equally — the gambling gang moves into positive territory. The tim e-average growth rate of the cooperating triumvirate is +1.5% per round. In this simple ga me, Gibran is very literally — mathematically — right: the solitary entity decays, dies wi th certainty. A few entities who have learned to give, on the other hand, may live.
The cooperating gamblers are not doing anything new, in a sense. They’re still just gambli ng, they haven’t developed any special skills, they can’t predict how the coin will land. All they’ve learned is to share, and just that allows them exponentially to outperform the ir non-cooperating peers (or former selves).
We can keep growing the group, and in the limit of infinitely many cooperators, wealth grows at the growth rate of the expected value.
By focusing on expected value, mainstream economics focuses on an object which grows as fast as the wealth of an infinite cooperative.
The most skilled can still do better by joining a less skilled collective, and we see mathematically how important it is to maintain diversity and avoid loss of identity in a cooperating group.
Athena Aktipis and her coworkers have studied attitudes and moral codes concerning cooperation in different societies, for instance among Maasai pastoralists in East Africa. Their work indicates that where survival is key, more generous systems of mutual aid emerge. Generosity may be thought of as a spectrum reaching from the individual coin toss, where no aid is ever received or provided, to cooperative coin tossing where “aid” is provided at every step whether it’s needed or not. In between lie different forms, where records may be kept to ensure future repayment of aid, or where the severity of need determines the degree of aid provided, with no expectation of repayment.
The coin toss says: where unintended consequences can be avoided, the more sharing takes place the faster we will make progress. The optimal level of cooperation appears not as the minimum required to avoid disaster. It is instead the maximum we can get away with without triggering unintended consequences.