

Global warming in the pipeline

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ABSTRACT

Improved knowledge of glacial-to-interglacial global temperature change implies that fast-feedback equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) is $1.2 \pm 0.3^\circ\text{C}$ (2σ) per W/m^2 , which is $4.8^\circ\text{C} \pm 1.2^\circ\text{C}$ for doubled CO_2 . Consistent analysis of temperature over the full Cenozoic era – including “slow” feedbacks by ice sheets and trace gases – supports this ECS and implies that CO_2 was 300-350 ppm in the Pliocene and about 450 ppm at transition to a nearly ice-free planet, thus exposing unrealistic lethargy of ice sheet models. Equilibrium global warming including slow feedbacks for today’s human-made greenhouse gas (GHG) climate forcing ($4.1 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$) is 10°C , reduced to 8°C by today’s aerosols. Decline of aerosol emissions since 2010 should increase the 1970-2010 global warming rate of 0.18°C per decade to a post-2010 rate of at least 0.27°C per decade. Under the current geopolitical approach to GHG emissions, global warming will likely pierce the 1.5°C ceiling in the 2020s and 2°C before 2050. Impacts on people and nature will accelerate as global warming pumps up hydrologic extremes. The enormity of consequences demands a return to Holocene-level global temperature. Required actions include: 1) a global increasing price on GHG emissions, 2) East-West cooperation in a way that accommodates developing world needs, and 3) intervention with Earth’s radiation imbalance to phase down today’s massive human-made “geo-transformation” of Earth’s climate. These changes will not happen with the current geopolitical approach, but current political crises present an opportunity for reset, especially if young people can grasp their situation.

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28 1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND STRUCTURE OF PAPER

29 It has been known since the 1800s that infrared-absorbing (greenhouse) gases (GHGs) warm
30 Earth's surface and that the abundance of GHGs changes naturally as well as from human
31 actions.^{1,2} Roger Revelle wrote in 1965 that we are conducting a “vast geophysical experiment”
32 by burning fossil fuels that accumulated in Earth's crust over hundreds of millions of years.³
33 Carbon dioxide (CO₂) in the air is now increasing and already has reached levels that have not
34 existed for millions of years, with consequences that have yet to be determined. Jule Charney led
35 a study in 1979 by the United States National Academy of Sciences that concluded that doubling
36 of atmospheric CO₂ was likely to cause global warming of $3 \pm 1.5^\circ\text{C}$.⁴ Charney added:
37 “However, we believe it is quite possible that the capacity of the intermediate waters of the
38 ocean to absorb heat could delay the estimated warming by several decades.”

39 After U.S. President Jimmy Carter signed the 1980 Energy Security Act, which included a focus
40 on unconventional fossil fuels such as coal gasification and rock fracturing (“fracking”) to
41 extract shale oil and tight gas, the U.S. Congress asked the National Academy of Sciences again
42 to assess potential climate effects. Their massive *Changing Climate* report had a measured tone
43 on energy policy – amounting to a call for research.⁵ Was not enough known to caution
44 lawmakers against taxpayer subsidy of the most carbon-intensive fossil fuels? Perhaps the
45 equanimity was due in part to a major error: the report assumed that the delay of global warming
46 caused by the ocean's thermal inertia is 15 years, independent of climate sensitivity. With that
47 assumption, they concluded that climate sensitivity for $2\times\text{CO}_2$ is near or below the low end of
48 Charney's 1.5-4.5°C range. If climate sensitivity was low and the lag between emissions and
49 climate response was only 15 years, climate change would not be nearly the threat that it is.

50 Simultaneous with preparation of *Changing Climate*, climate sensitivity was addressed at the
51 1982 Ewing Symposium at the Lamont Doherty Geophysical Observatory of Columbia
52 University on 25-27 October, with papers published in January 1984 as a monograph of the
53 American Geophysical Union.⁶ Paleoclimate data and global climate modeling together led to an
54 inference that climate sensitivity is in the range 2.5-5°C for $2\times\text{CO}_2$ and that climate response
55 time to a forcing is of the order of a century, not 15 years.⁷ Thus, the concept that a large amount
56 of additional human-made warming is already “in the pipeline” was introduced. E.E. David, Jr.,
57 President of Exxon Research and Engineering, in his keynote talk at the symposium insightfully
58 noted⁸: “The critical problem is that the environmental impacts of the CO₂ buildup may be so
59 long delayed. A look at the theory of feedback systems shows that where there is such a long
60 delay, the system breaks down, unless there is anticipation built into the loop.”

61 Thus, the danger caused by climate's delayed response and the need for anticipatory action to
62 alter the course of fossil fuel development was apparent to scientists and the fossil fuel industry
63 40 years ago.⁹ Yet industry chose to long deny the need to change energy course,¹⁰ and now,
64 while governments and financial interests connive, most industry adopts a “greenwash” approach
65 that threatens to lock in perilous consequences for humanity. Scientists will share responsibility,
66 if we allow governments to rely on goals for future global GHG levels, as if targets had meaning
67 in the absence of policies required to achieve them.

68 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 to provide
69 scientific assessments on the state of knowledge about climate change¹¹ and almost all nations
70 agreed to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change¹² with the
71 objective to avert “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The current
72 IPCC Working Group 1 report¹³ provides a best estimate of 3°C for equilibrium global climate
73 sensitivity to 2×CO₂ and describes shutdown of the overturning ocean circulations and large sea
74 level rise on the century time scale as “high impact, low probability” even under extreme GHG
75 growth scenarios. This contrasts with “high impact, high probability” assessments reached in a
76 paper¹⁴ – hereafter abbreviated *Ice Melt* – that several of us published in 2016. Recently, our
77 paper’s first author (JEH) described a long-time effort to understand the effect of ocean mixing
78 and aerosols on observed and projected climate change, which led to a conclusion that most
79 climate models are unrealistically insensitive to freshwater injected by melting ice and that ice
80 sheet models are unrealistically lethargic in the face of rapid, large climate change.¹⁵

81 Eelco Rohling, editor of Oxford Open Climate Change, invited a perspective article on these
82 issues. Our principal motivation in this paper is concern that IPCC has underestimated climate
83 sensitivity and understated the threat of large sea level rise and shutdown of ocean overturning
84 circulations, but these issues, because of their complexity, must be addressed in two steps. Our
85 present paper addresses climate sensitivity and warming in the pipeline, concluding that these
86 exceed IPCC’s best estimates. Response of ocean circulation and ice sheet dynamics to global
87 warming– already outlined in the *Ice Melt* paper – will be addressed further in a later paper.¹⁶

88 The structure of our present paper is as follows. Section 2 (Climate Sensitivity) makes a fresh
89 evaluation of Charney’s equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) based on improved paleoclimate
90 data and introduces Earth system sensitivity (ESS), which includes the feedbacks that Charney
91 held fixed. Section 3 (Climate Response Time) explores the fast-feedback response time of
92 Earth’s temperature and energy imbalance to an imposed forcing, concluding that cloud
93 feedbacks buffer heat uptake by the ocean, thus increasing warming in the pipeline and making
94 Earth’s energy imbalance an underestimate of the forcing reduction required to stabilize climate.
95 Section 4 (Cenozoic Era) analyzes temperature change of the past 66 million years, tightens
96 evaluation of climate sensitivity, and assesses the history of CO₂, thus providing insights about
97 climate change. Section 5 (Aerosols) addresses the absence of aerosol forcing data via inferences
98 from paleo data and modern global temperature change, and we point out potential information
99 in “the great inadvertent aerosol experiment” provided by recent restrictions on fuels in
100 international shipping. Section 6 (Summary) discusses policy implications of high climate
101 sensitivity and the delayed response of the climate system. Warming in the pipeline need not
102 appear. We can take actions that slow and reverse global warming; indeed, we suggest that such
103 actions are needed to avoid disastrous consequences for humanity and nature. Reduction of
104 greenhouse gas emissions as rapidly as practical has highest priority, but that policy alone is now
105 inadequate and must be complemented by additional actions to affect Earth’s energy balance.
106 The world is still early in this “vast geophysical experiment” – as far as consequences are
107 concerned – but time has run short for the “anticipation” that E.E. David recommended.

108 **2. CLIMATE SENSITIVITY (ECS AND ESS)**

109 This section gives a brief overview of the history of ECS estimates since the Charney report and
110 uses glacial-to-interglacial climate change to infer an improved estimate of ECS. We discuss
111 how ECS and the more general Earth system sensitivity (ESS) depend upon the climate state.

112 Charney defined ECS as the eventual global temperature change caused by doubled CO₂ if ice
113 sheets, vegetation and long-lived GHGs are fixed (except the specified CO₂ doubling). Other
114 quantities affecting Earth's energy balance – clouds, aerosols, water vapor, snow cover and sea
115 ice – change rapidly in response to climate change. Thus, Charney's ECS is also called the “fast
116 feedback” climate sensitivity. Feedbacks interact in many ways, so their changes are calculated
117 in global climate models (GCMs) that simulate such interactions. Charney implicitly assumed
118 that change of the ice sheets on Greenland and Antarctica – which we categorize as a “slow
119 feedback” – was not important on time scales of most public interest.

120 ECS defined by Charney is a gedanken concept that helps us study the effect of human-made and
121 natural climate forcings. If knowledge of ECS were based only on models, it would be difficult
122 to narrow the range of estimated climate sensitivity – or have confidence in any range – because
123 we do not know how well feedbacks are modeled or if the models include all significant real-
124 world feedbacks. Cloud and aerosol interactions are complex, e.g., and even small cloud changes
125 can have a large effect. Thus, data on Earth's paleoclimate history are essential, allowing us to
126 compare different climate states, knowing that all feedbacks operated.

127 **2.1. Climate sensitivity estimated at the 1982 Ewing Symposium**

128 Climate sensitivity was addressed in our paper⁷ for the Ewing Symposium monograph using the
129 feedback framework implied by E.E. David and employed by electrical engineers.¹⁷ The climate
130 forcing caused by 2×CO₂ – the imposed perturbation of Earth's energy balance – is ~ 4 W/m². If
131 there were no climate feedbacks and Earth radiated energy to space as a perfect black surface,
132 Earth's temperature would need to increase ~ 1.2°C to increase radiation to space 4 W/m² and
133 restore energy balance. However, feedbacks occur in the real world and in GCMs. In our GCM
134 the equilibrium response to 2×CO₂ was 4°C warming of Earth's surface. Thus, the fraction of
135 equilibrium warming due directly to the CO₂ change was 0.3 (1.2°C/4°C) and the feedback
136 “gain,” g, was 0.7 (2.8°C/4°C). Algebraically, ECS and feedback gain are related by

$$137 \text{ECS} = 1.2^\circ\text{C}/(1-g). \quad (1)$$

138 We evaluated contributions of individual feedback processes to g by inserting changes of water
139 vapor, clouds, and surface albedo (reflectivity, literally whiteness, due to sea ice and snow
140 changes) from the 2×CO₂ GCM simulation one-by-one into a one-dimensional radiative-
141 convective model,¹⁸ finding g_{wv} = 0.4, g_{cl} = 0.2, g_{sa} = 0.1, where g_{wv}, g_{cl}, and g_{sa} are the water
142 vapor, cloud and surface albedo gains. The 0.2 cloud gain was about equally from a small
143 increase in cloud top height and a small decrease in cloud cover. These feedbacks all seemed
144 reasonable, but how could we verify their magnitudes or the net ECS due to all feedbacks?

145 We recognized the potential of emerging paleoclimate data. Early data from polar ice cores
146 revealed that atmospheric CO₂ was much less during glacial periods and the CLIMAP project¹⁹

147 used proxy data to reconstruct global surface conditions during the Last Glacial Maximum
148 (LGM), which peaked about 20,000 years ago. A powerful constraint was the fact that Earth had
149 to be in energy balance averaged over the several millennia of the LGM. However, when we
150 employed CLIMAP boundary conditions including sea surface temperatures (SSTs), Earth was
151 out of energy balance, radiating 2.1 W/m^2 to space., i.e., Earth was trying to cool off with an
152 enormous energy imbalance, equivalent to half of $2\times\text{CO}_2$ forcing.

153 Something was wrong with either assumed LGM conditions or our climate model. We tried
154 CLIMAP's maximal land ice – this only reduced the energy imbalance from 2.1 to 1.6 W/m^2 .
155 Moreover, we had taken LGM CO_2 as 200 ppm and did not know that CH_4 and N_2O were less in
156 the LGM than in the present interglacial period; accurate GHGs and CLIMAP SSTs produce a
157 planetary energy imbalance close to 3 W/m^2 . Most feedbacks in our model were set by CLIMAP.
158 Sea ice is set by CLIMAP. Water vapor depends on surface temperature, which is set by
159 CLIMAP SSTs. Cloud feedback is uncertain, but ECS smaller than 2.4°C for $2\times\text{CO}_2$ would
160 require a negative cloud gain. $g_{\text{cl}} \sim 0.2$ from our GCM increases ECS from 2.4°C to 4°C (eq. 1)
161 and accounts for almost the entire difference of sensitivities of our model (4°C for $2\times\text{CO}_2$) and
162 the Manabe and Stouffer model²⁰ (2°C for $2\times\text{CO}_2$) that had fixed cloud cover and cloud height.
163 Manabe suggested²¹ that our higher ECS was due to a too-large sea ice and snow feedback, but
164 we noted⁷ that sea ice in our control run was less than observed, so we likely understated sea ice
165 feedback. Amplifying feedback due to high clouds increasing in height with warming is expected
166 and is found in observations, large-eddy simulations and GCMs.²² Sherwood *et al.*²³ conclude
167 that negative low-cloud feedback is “neither credibly suggested by any model, nor by physical
168 principles, nor by observations.” Despite a wide spread among models, GCMs today show an
169 amplifying cloud feedback due to increases in cloud height and decreases in cloud amount,
170 despite increases in cloud albedo.²⁴ These cloud changes are found in all observed cloud regimes
171 and locations, implying robust thermodynamic control.²⁵

172 CLIMAP SSTs were a more likely cause of the planetary energy imbalance. Co-author D. Peteet
173 used pollen data to infer LGM tropical and subtropical cooling $2\text{-}3^\circ\text{C}$ greater than in a GCM
174 forced by CLIMAP SSTs. D. Rind and Peteet found that montane LGM snowlines in the tropics
175 descended 1 km in the LGM, inconsistent with climate constrained by CLIMAP SSTs. CLIMAP
176 assumed that tiny shelled marine species migrate to stay in a temperature zone they inhabit
177 today. But what if these species partly adapt over millennia to changing temperature? Based on
178 the work of Rind and Peteet, later published,²⁶ we suspected but could not prove that CLIMAP
179 SSTs were too warm.

180 Based on GCM simulations for $2\times\text{CO}_2$, on our feedback analysis for the LGM, and on observed
181 global warming in the past century, we estimated that ECS was in the range $2.5\text{-}5^\circ\text{C}$ for $2\times\text{CO}_2$.
182 If CLIMAP SSTs were accurate, ECS was near the low end of that range. In contrast, our
183 analysis implied that ECS for $2\times\text{CO}_2$ was in the upper half of the $2.5\text{-}5^\circ\text{C}$ range, but our analysis
184 depended in part on our GCM, which had sensitivity 4°C for $2\times\text{CO}_2$. To resolve the matter, a
185 paleo thermometer independent of biologic adaptation was needed. Several decades later, such a
186 paleo thermometer and advanced analysis techniques exist. We will use recent studies to infer
187 our present best estimates for ECS and ESS. First, however, we will comment on other estimates
188 of climate sensitivity and clarify the definition of climate forcings that we employ.

189 2.2. IPCC and independent climate sensitivity estimates

190 Reviews of climate sensitivity are available, e.g., Rohling *et al.*,²⁷ which focuses on the physics
191 of the climate system, and Sherwood *et al.*,²³ which adds emphasis on probabilistic combination
192 of multiple uncertainties. Progress in narrowing the uncertainty in climate sensitivity was slow in
193 the first five IPCC assessment reports. The fifth assessment report²⁸ (AR5) in 2014 concluded
194 only – with 66% probability – that ECS was in the range 1.5-4.5°C, the same as Charney’s report
195 35 years earlier. The broad spectrum of information on climate change – especially constraints
196 imposed by paleoclimate data – at last affected AR6,¹³ which concluded with 66% probability
197 that ECS is 2.5-4°C, with 3°C as their best estimate (AR6 Fig. TS.6).

198 Sherwood *et al.*²³ combine three lines of evidence: climate feedback studies, historical climate
199 change, and paleoclimate data, inferring $S = 2.6-3.9^\circ\text{C}$ with 66% probability for $2\times\text{CO}_2$, where S
200 is an “effective sensitivity” relevant to a 150-year time scale. They find ECS only slightly larger:
201 2.6-4.1°C with 66% probability. Climate feedback studies, inherently, cannot yield a sharp
202 definition of ECS, as we showed in the cloud feedback discussion above. Earth’s climate system
203 includes amplifying feedbacks that push the gain, g , closer to unity than zero, thus making ECS
204 sensitive to uncertainty in any feedback; the resulting sensitivity of ECS to g prohibits precise
205 evaluation from feedback analysis. Similarly, historical climate change cannot define ECS well
206 because the aerosol climate forcing is unmeasured. Also, forced and unforced ocean dynamics
207 give rise to a pattern effect:²⁹ the geographic pattern of transient and equilibrium temperature
208 changes differ, which affects ECS inferred from transient climate change. These difficulties help
209 explain how Sherwood *et al.*²³ could estimate ECS as only 6% larger than S , an implausible
210 result in view of the ocean’s great thermal inertia. An intercomparison of GCMs run for
211 millennial time scales, LongRunMIP,³⁰ includes 14 simulations of 9 GCMs with runs of 5,000
212 years (or close enough for extrapolation to 5,000 years). Their global warmings at 5,000 years
213 range from 30% to 80% larger than their 150-year responses.

214 Our approach is to compare glacial and interglacial equilibrium climate states. The change of
215 atmospheric and surface forcings can be defined accurately, thus leading to a sharp evaluation of
216 ECS for cases in which equilibrium response is assured. With this knowledge in hand, additional
217 information can be extracted from historical and paleo climate changes.

218 2.3. Climate forcing definitions

219 Attention to climate forcing definitions is essential for quantitative analysis of climate change.
220 However, readers uninterested in radiative forcings may skip this section with little penalty. We
221 describe our climate forcing definition and compare our forcings with those of IPCC. Our total
222 GHG forcing matches that of IPCC within a few percent, but this close fit hides larger
223 differences in individual forcings that deserve attention.

224 Equilibrium global surface temperature change is related to ECS by

$$225 \Delta T_s \sim F \times \text{ECS} = F \times \lambda, \quad (2)$$

226 where λ is a widely used abbreviation of ECS, ΔT_s is the global mean equilibrium surface
227 temperature change in response to climate forcing F , which is measured in W/m^2 averaged over
228 the entire planetary surface. There are alternative ways to define F , as discussed in Chapter 8³¹ of


229 AR5 and in a paper³² hereafter called *Efficacy*. Objectives are to find a definition of F such that
230 different forcing mechanisms of the same magnitude yield a similar global temperature change,
231 but also a definition that can be computed easily and reliably. The first four IPCC reports used
232 adjusted forcing, F_a , which is Earth’s energy imbalance after stratospheric temperature adjusts to
233 presence of the forcing agent. F_a usually yields a consistent response among different forcing
234 agents, but there are exceptions such as black carbon aerosols; F_a exaggerates their impact. Also,
235 F_a is awkward to compute and depends on definition of the tropopause, which varies among
236 models. F_s , the fixed SST forcing (including fixed sea ice), is more robust than F_a as a predictor
237 of climate response,^{32,33} but a GCM is required to compute F_s . In *Efficacy*, F_s is defined as

$$238 \quad F_s = F_o + \delta T_o / \lambda \quad (3)$$

239 where F_o is Earth’s energy imbalance after atmosphere and land surface adjust to the presence of
240 the forcing agent with SST fixed. F_o is not a full measure of the strength of a forcing, because a
241 portion (δT_o) of the equilibrium warming is already present as F_o is computed. A GCM run of
242 about 100 years is needed to accurately define F_o because of unforced atmospheric variability.
243 That GCM run also defines δT_o , the global mean surface air temperature change caused by the
244 forcing with SST fixed. λ is the model’s ECS in °C per W/m². $\delta T_o / \lambda$ is the portion of the total
245 forcing (F_s) that is “used up” in causing the δT_o warming; radiative flux to space increases by
246 $\delta T_o / \lambda$ due to warming of the land surface and global air. The term $\delta T_o / \lambda$ is usually, but not
247 always, less than 10% of F_o . Thus, it is better not to neglect $\delta T_o / \lambda$. IPCC AR5 and AR6 define
248 effective radiative forcing as ERF = F_o . Omission of $\delta T_o / \lambda$ was intentional³¹ and is not an issue if
249 the practice is followed consistently. However, when the forcing is used to calculate global
250 surface temperature response, the forcing to use is F_s , not F_o . It would be useful if both F_o and
251 δT_o were reported for all climate models.

252 A further refinement of climate forcing is suggested in *Efficacy*: effective forcing (F_e) defined by
253 a long GCM run with calculated ocean temperature. The resulting global surface temperature
254 change, relative to that for equal CO₂ forcing, defines the forcing’s efficacy. Effective forcings,
255 F_e , were found to be within a few percent of F_s for most forcing agents, i.e., the results confirm
256 that F_s is a robust forcing. This support is for F_s , not for $F_o = \text{ERF}$, which is systematically
257 smaller than F_s . The Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) GCM^{34,35} used for CMIP6³⁶
258 studies, which we label the GISS (2020) model,³⁷ has higher resolution (2°×2.5° and 40
259 atmospheric layers) and other changes that yield a moister upper troposphere and lower
260 stratosphere, relative to the GISS model used in *Efficacy*. GHG forcings reported for the GISS
261 (2020) model^{34,35} are smaller than in prior GISS models, a change attributed³⁵ to blanketing by
262 high level water vapor. However, part of the change is from comparison of F_o in GISS (2020) to
263 F_s in earlier models. The 2×CO₂ fixed SST simulation with the GISS (2020) model yields $F_o =$
264 3.59 W/m^2 , $\delta T_o = 0.27^\circ\text{C}$ and $\lambda = 0.9 \text{ }^\circ\text{C per W/m}^2$. Thus $F_s = 3.59 + 0.30 = 3.89 \text{ W/m}^2$, which is
265 only 5.4% smaller than the $F_s = 4.11 \text{ W/m}^2$ for the GISS model used in *Efficacy*.

266 Our GHG effective forcing, F_e , was obtained in two steps. Adjusted forcings, F_a , were calculated
267 for each gas for a large range of gas amount with a global-mean radiative-convective model that
268 incorporated the GISS GCM radiation code, which uses the correlated k-distribution method³⁸
269 and high spectral resolution laboratory data.³⁹ The F_a are converted to effective forcings (F_e) via
270 efficacy factors (E_a ; Table 1 of *Efficacy*) based on GCM simulations that include the 3-D
271 distribution of each gas. The total GHG forcing is




272
 273 Fig. 1. IPCC AR6 Annex III greenhouse gas forcing,¹³ which employs F_a for O_3 and F_o for other
 274 GHGs, compared with the effective forcing, F_e , from Eq. (4). See discussion in text.

275
$$F_e = F_a(CO_2) + 1.45 F_a(CH_4) + 1.04 F_a(N_2O) + 1.32 F_a(MPTGs + OTGs) + 0.45 F_a(O_3). \quad (4)$$

276 The CH_4 coefficient (1.45) includes the effect of CH_4 on O_3 and stratospheric H_2O , as well as the
 277 efficacy (1.10) of CH_4 per se. We assume that CH_4 is responsible for 45% of the O_3 change.⁴⁰
 278 Forcing caused by the remaining 55% of the O_3 change is based on IPCC AR6 O_3 forcing ($F_a =$
 279 0.47 W/m^2 in 2019); we multiply this AR6 O_3 forcing by $0.55 \times 0.82 = 0.45$, where 0.82 is the
 280 efficacy of O_3 forcing from Table 1 of *Efficacy*. Thus, the non- CH_4 portion of the O_3 forcing is
 281 0.21 W/m^2 in 2019. MPTGs and OTGs are Montreal Protocol Trace Gases and Other Trace
 282 Gases.⁴¹ A list of these gases and a table of annual forcings since 1992 are [available](#) as well as
 283 the [earlier data](#).⁴²

284 The climate forcing from our formulae is slightly larger than IPCC AR6 forcings (Fig. 1). In
 285 2019, the final year of AR6 data, our GHG forcing is 4.00 W/m^2 ; the AR6 forcing is 3.84 W/m^2 .
 286 Our forcing should be larger, because IPCC forcings are F_o for all gases except O_3 , for which
 287 they provide F_a (AR6 section 7.3.2.5). Table 1 in *Efficacy* allows accurate comparison: δT_o for
 288 $2 \times CO_2$ for the GISS model used in *Efficacy* is $0.22^\circ C$, λ is $0.67^\circ C$ per W/m^2 , so $\delta T_o/\lambda = 0.33$
 289 W/m^2 . Thus, the conversion factor from F_o to F_e (or F_s) is $4.11/(4.11-0.33)$. The non- O_3 portion
 290 of AR6 2019 forcing ($3.84 - 0.47 = 3.37$) W/m^2 increases to 3.664 W/m^2 . The O_3 portion of the
 291 AR6 2019 forcing (0.47 W/m^2) decreases to 0.385 W/m^2 because the efficacy of $F_a(O_3)$ is 0.82.
 292 The AR6 GHG forcing in 2019 is thus $\sim 4.05 \text{ W/m}^2$, expressed as $F_e \sim F_s$, which is $\sim 1\%$ larger
 293 than follows from our formulae. This precise agreement is not indicative of the true uncertainty
 294 in the GHG forcing, which IPCC AR6 estimates as 10%, thus about 0.4 W/m^2 . We concur with
 295 their error estimate and employ it in our ECS uncertainty analysis (Section 6.1).

296 We conclude that the GHG increase since 1750 already produces a climate forcing equivalent to
 297 that of $2 \times CO_2$ (our formulae yield $F_e \sim F_s = 4.08 \text{ W/m}^2$ for 2021 and 4.13 W/m^2 for 2022; IPCC
 298 AR6 has $F_s = 4.14 \text{ W/m}^2$ for 2021). The human-made $2 \times CO_2$ climate forcing imagined by
 299 Charney, Tyndall and other greenhouse giants is no longer imaginary. Humanity is now taking
 300 its first steps into the period of consequences. Earth's paleoclimate history helps us assess the
 301 potential outcomes.




302
 303 Fig. 2. Antarctic Dome C temperature for past 800 ky from Jouzel *et al.*⁴³ relative to the mean of
 304 the last 10 ky and Dome C CO₂ amount from Luthi *et al.*⁴⁴ (kyBP is kiloyears before present).

305 **2.4. Glacial-to-interglacial climate oscillations**

306 In this section we describe how ice core data help us assess ECS for climate states from glacial
 307 conditions to interglacial periods such as the Holocene, the interglacial period of the past 12,000
 308 years. We discuss climate sensitivity in warmer climates in Section 4 (Cenozoic Era).

309 Air bubbles in Antarctic ice cores – trapped as snow piled up and compressed into ice – preserve
 310 a record of long-lived GHGs for at least 800,000 years. Isotopic composition of the ice provides
 311 a measure of temperature in and near Antarctica.⁴³ Changes of temperature and CO₂ are highly
 312 correlated (Fig. 2). This does not mean that CO₂ is the primal cause of the climate oscillations.
 313 Hays *et al.*⁴⁵ showed that small changes of Earth’s orbit and the tilt of Earth’s spin axis are
 314 pacemakers of the ice ages. Orbital changes alter the seasonal and geographical distribution of
 315 insolation, which affects ice sheet size and GHG amount. Long-term climate is sensitive because
 316 ice sheets and GHGs act as amplifying feedbacks:⁴⁶ as Earth warms, ice sheets shrink, expose a
 317 darker surface, and absorb more sunlight; also, as Earth warms, the ocean and continents release
 318 GHGs to the air. These amplifying feedbacks work in the opposite sense as Earth cools. Orbital
 319 forcings oscillate slowly over tens and hundreds of thousands of years.⁴⁷ The picture of how
 320 Earth orbital changes drive millennial climate change was painted in the 1920s by Milutin
 321 Milankovitch, who built on 19th century hypotheses of James Croll and Joseph Adhémar.
 322 Paleoclimate changes of ice sheets and GHGs are sometimes described as slow feedbacks,⁴⁸ but
 323 their slow change is paced by the Earth orbital forcing; their slow change does not mean that
 324 these feedbacks cannot operate more rapidly in response to a rapid climate forcing.

325 We evaluate ECS by comparing stable climate states before and after a glacial-to-interglacial
 326 climate transition. GHG amounts are known from ice cores and ice sheet sizes are known from
 327 geologic data. This empirical ECS applies to the range of global temperature covered by ice
 328 cores, which we will conclude is about -7°C to $+1^{\circ}\text{C}$ relative to the Holocene. The Holocene is
 329 an unusual interglacial. Maximum melt rate was at 13.2 kyBP, as expected,⁴⁹ and GHG amounts
 330 began to decline after peaking early in the Holocene, as in most interglacials. However, several
 331 ky later, CO₂ and CH₄ increased, raising a question of whether humans were affecting GHGs.
 332 Ruddiman⁵⁰ suggests that deforestation began to affect CO₂ 6500 years ago and rice irrigation
 333 began to affect CH₄ 5,000 years ago. Those possibilities complicate use of LGM-Holocene
 334 warming to estimate ECS. However, sea level, and thus the size of the ice sheets, had stabilized
 335 by 7,000 years ago (Section 5.1). Thus, the millennium centered on 7 kyBP provides a good
 336 period to compare with the LGM. Comparison of the Eemian interglacial (Fig. 2) with the prior
 337 glacial maximum (PGM) has potential for independent assessment.



338
 339 Fig. 3. Dome C temperature (Jouzel *et al.*⁴³) and multi-ice core GHG amounts (Schilt *et al.*).⁵¹
 340 Green bars (1-5, 6.5-7.5, 18-21, 120-126, 137-144 kyBP) are periods of calculations.

341 2.5. LGM-Holocene and PGM-Eemian evaluation of ECS

342 In this section we evaluate ECS by comparing neighboring glacial and interglacial periods when
 343 Earth was in energy balance within less than 0.1 W/m^2 averaged over a millennium. Larger
 344 imbalance would cause temperature or sea level change that did not occur.⁵² Thus, we can assess
 345 ECS from knowledge of atmospheric and surface forcings that maintained these climates.

346 Recent advanced analysis techniques allow improved estimate of paleo temperatures. Tierney *et al.*⁵³
 347 exclude micro biology fossils whose potential to adapt makes them dubious thermometers.
 348 Instead, they use a large collection of geochemical (isotope) proxies for SST in an analysis
 349 constrained by climate change patterns defined by GCMs. They find cooling of 6.1°C (95%
 350 confidence: $5.7\text{-}6.5^\circ\text{C}$) for the interval 23-19 kyBP. A similarly constrained global analysis by
 351 Osman *et al.*⁵⁴ finds LGM cooling at 21-18 kyBP of $7.0 \pm 1^\circ\text{C}$ (95% confidence).⁵⁵ Tierney
 352 (priv. comm.) attributes the difference between the two studies to the broader time interval of the
 353 former study, and suggests that peak LGM cooling was near 7°C .

354 Seltzer *et al.*⁵⁶ use the temperature-dependent solubility of dissolved noble gases in ancient
 355 groundwater to show that land areas between 45°S and 35°N cooled $5.8 \pm 0.6^\circ\text{C}$ in the LGM.
 356 This cooling is consistent with 1 km lowering of alpine snowlines found by Rind and Peteet.²⁶
 357 Land response to a forcing exceeds ocean response, but polar amplification makes the global
 358 response as large as the low latitude land response in GCM simulations with fixed ice sheets (SM
 359 Fig. S3). When ice sheet growth is added, cooling amplification at mid and high latitudes is
 360 greater,⁷ making 5.8°C cooling of low latitude land consistent with global cooling of $\sim 7^\circ\text{C}$.

361 LGM CO_2 , CH_4 and N_2O amounts are known accurately with the exception of N_2O in the PGM
 362 when N_2O reactions with dust in the ice core corrupt the data. We take PGM N_2O as the mean of
 363 the smallest reported PGM amount and the LGM amount; potential error in the N_2O forcing is
 364 $\sim 0.01 \text{ W/m}^2$. We calculate CO_2 , CH_4 , and N_2O forcings using Eq. (4) and formulae for each gas
 365 in Supp. Material for the periods shown by green bars in Fig. 3. The Eemian period avoids early
 366 CO_2 and temperature spikes, assuring that Earth was in energy balance. Between the LGM (19-
 367 21 kyBP) and Holocene (6.5-7.5 kyBP), GHG forcing increased 2.25 W/m^2 with 77% from CO_2 .
 368 Between the PGM and Eemian, GHG forcing increased 2.30 W/m^2 with 79% from CO_2 .

369 Glacial-interglacial aerosol changes are not included as a forcing. Natural aerosol changes, like
 370 clouds, are fast feedbacks. Indeed, aerosols and clouds form a continuum and distinction is
 371 arbitrary as humidity approaches 100 percent. There are many aerosol types, including VOCs
 372 (volatile organic compounds) produced by trees, sea salt produced by wind and waves, black and
 373 organic carbon produced by forest and grass fires, dust produced by wind and drought, and

374 marine biologic dimethyl sulfide and its secondary aerosol products, all varying geographically
375 and in response to climate change. We do not know, or need to know, natural aerosol properties
376 in prior eras because their changes are feedbacks included in the climate response. However,
377 human-made aerosols are a climate forcing (an imposed perturbation of Earth's energy balance).
378 Humans may have begun to affect gases and aerosols by the mid-Holocene (Section 5), but we
379 minimize that issue by using the 6.5-7.5 kyBP window to evaluate climate sensitivity.

380 Earth's surface change is the other forcing needed to evaluate ECS: (1) change of surface albedo
381 (reflectivity) and topography by ice sheets, (2) vegetation change, e.g., boreal forests replaced by
382 brighter tundra, and (3) continental shelves exposed by lower sea level. Forcing by all three can
383 be evaluated at once with a GCM. Accuracy requires realistic clouds, which shield the surface.
384 Clouds are the most uncertain feedback.⁵⁷ Evaluation is ideal for CMIP⁵⁸ (Coupled Model
385 Intercomparison Project) collaboration with PMIP⁵⁹ (Paleoclimate Modelling Intercomparison
386 Project); a study of LGM surface forcing could aid GCM development and assessment of climate
387 sensitivity. Sherwood *et al.*²³ review studies of LGM ice sheet forcing and settle on 3.2 ± 0.7
388 W/m^2 , the same as IPCC AR4.⁶⁰ However, some GCMs yield efficacies as low as ~ 0.75 ⁶¹ or
389 even ~ 0.5 ,⁶² likely due to cloud shielding. We found⁷ a forcing of -0.9 W/m^2 for LGM
390 vegetation by using the Koppen⁶³ scheme to relate vegetation to local climate, but we thought the
391 model effect was exaggerated as real-world forests tends to shake off snow albedo effects.
392 Kohler *et al.*⁶⁴ estimate a continental shelf forcing of -0.6 W/m^2 . Based on an earlier study⁶⁵
393 (hereafter *Target CO₂*), our estimate of LGM-Holocene surface forcing is $3.5 \pm 1 \text{ W/m}^2$. Thus,
394 LGM (18-21 kyBP) cooling of 7°C relative to mid-Holocene (7 kyBP), GHG forcing of 2.25
395 W/m^2 , and surface forcing of 3.5 W/m^2 yield an initial ECS estimate $7/(2.25 + 3.5) = 1.22^\circ\text{C}$ per
396 W/m^2 . We discuss uncertainties in Section 6.1.

397 PGM-Eemian global warming provides a second assessment of ECS, one that avoids concern
398 about human influence. PGM-Eemian GHG forcing is 2.3 W/m^2 . We estimate surface albedo
399 forcing as 0.3 W/m^2 less than in the LGM because sea level was about 10 m higher during the
400 PGM.⁶⁶ North American and Eurasian ice sheet sizes differed between the LGM and PGM,⁶⁷ but
401 division of mass between them has little effect on the net forcing (Fig. S4⁶⁵). Thus, our central
402 estimate of PGM-Eemian forcing is 5.5 W/m^2 . Eemian temperature reached about $+1^\circ\text{C}$ warmer
403 than the Holocene,⁶⁸ based on Eemian SSTs of $+0.5 \pm 0.3^\circ\text{C}$ relative to 1870-1889,⁶⁹ or $+0.65 \pm$
404 0.3°C SST and $+1^\circ\text{C}$ global (land plus ocean) relative to 1880-1920. However, the PGM was
405 probably warmer than the LGM; it was warmer at Dome C (Fig.2), but cooler at Dronning Maud
406 Land.⁷⁰ Based on deep ocean temperatures (Section 4), we estimate PGM-Eemian warming as
407 0.5°C greater than LGM-Holocene warming, i.e., 7.5°C . The resulting ECS is $7.5/5.5 = 1.36^\circ\text{C}$
408 per W/m^2 . Although PGM temperature lacks quantification comparable to that of Seltzer *et al.*⁵⁶
409 and Tierney *et al.*⁵³ for the LGM, the PGM-Eemian warming provides support for the high ECS
410 inferred from LGM-Holocene warming.

411 We conclude that ECS for climate in the Holocene-LGM range is $1.2^\circ\text{C} \pm 0.3^\circ\text{C}$ per W/m^2 ,
412 where the uncertainty is the 95% confidence range. The uncertainty estimate is inherently
413 subjective, as it depends mainly on the ice age surface albedo forcing. The GHG forcing and
414 glacial-interglacial temperature change are well-defined, but the efficacy of ice age surface
415 forcing varies among GCMs. This variability is likely related to cloud shielding of surface
416 albedo, which reaffirms the need for a focus on precise cloud observations and modeling.

417 **2.6 State dependence of climate sensitivity**

418 ECS based on glacial-interglacial climate is an average for global temperatures -7°C to $+1^{\circ}\text{C}$
419 relative to the Holocene and in general differs for other climate states because water vapor,
420 aerosol-cloud and sea ice feedbacks depend on the initial climate. However, ECS is rather flat
421 between today's climate and warmer climate, based on a study⁷¹ covering a range of 15 CO_2
422 doublings using an efficient GCM developed by Gary Russell.⁷² Toward colder climate, ice-
423 snow albedo feedback increases nonlinearly, reaching snowball Earth conditions – with snow
424 and ice on land reaching sea level in the tropics – when CO_2 declines to a quarter to an eighth of
425 its 1950 abundance (Fig. 7 of the study).⁷¹ Snowball Earth occurred several times in Earth's
426 history, most recently about 600 million years ago⁷³ when the Sun was 6% dimmer⁷⁴ than today,
427 a forcing of about -12 W/m^2 . Toward warmer climate, the water vapor feedback increases as the
428 tropopause rises,⁷⁵ the tropopause cold trap disappearing at $32\times\text{CO}_2$ (Fig. 7).⁷¹ However, for the
429 range of ECS of practical interest – say from half preindustrial CO_2 to $4\times\text{CO}_2$ – state dependence
430 of ECS is small compared to state dependence of ESS.

431 Earth system sensitivity (ESS) includes amplifying feedbacks of GHGs and ice sheets. When we
432 consider CO_2 change as a known forcing, other GHGs provide a feedback that is smaller than the
433 ice sheet feedback, but not negligible. Ice core data on GHG amounts show that non- CO_2 GHGs
434 – including O_3 and stratospheric H_2O produced by changing CH_4 – provide about 20% of the
435 total GHG forcing, not only on average for the full glacial-interglacial change, but as a function
436 of global temperature right up to $+1^{\circ}\text{C}$ global temperature relative to the Holocene (Fig. S5).
437 Atmospheric chemistry modeling suggests that non- CO_2 GHG amplification of CO_2 forcing by
438 about a quarter continues into warmer climate states.⁷⁶ Thus, for climate change in the Cenozoic
439 era, we approximate non- CO_2 GHG forcing by increasing the CO_2 forcing by one-quarter.

440 Ice sheet feedback, in contrast to non- CO_2 GHG feedback, is highly nonlinear. Preindustrial
441 climate was at most a few halvings of CO_2 from runaway snowball Earth and LGM climate was
442 even closer to that climate state. The ice sheet feedback is reduced as Earth heads toward warmer
443 climate today because already two-thirds of LGM ice has been lost. Yet remaining ice on
444 Antarctica and Greenland constitutes a powerful feedback, which humanity is about to bring into
445 play. We can illuminate that feedback and the climate path Earth is now on by examining data on
446 the Cenozoic era – which includes CO_2 levels comparable to today's amount – but first we must
447 consider climate response time.

448 3. CLIMATE RESPONSE TIME

449 In this section we define response functions for global temperature and Earth’s energy imbalance
450 that help explain the physics of climate change. Response functions help reveal the role of cloud
451 feedbacks in amplifying climate sensitivity and the fact that cloud feedbacks buffer the rate at
452 which the ocean can take up heat.

453 Climate response time was surprisingly long in our climate simulations⁷ for the 1982 Ewing
454 Symposium. The e-folding time – the time for surface temperature to reach 63% of its
455 equilibrium response – was about a century. The only published atmosphere-ocean GCM – that
456 of Bryan and Manabe⁷⁷ – had a response time of 25 years, while several simplified climate
457 models referenced in our Ewing paper had even faster responses. The longer response time of
458 our climate model was largely a result of high climate sensitivity – our model had an ECS of 4°C
459 for 2×CO₂ while the Bryan and Manabe model had an ECS of 2°C.

460 The physics is straightforward. If the delay were a result of a fixed source of thermal inertia, say
461 the ocean’s well-mixed upper layer, response time would increase linearly with ECS because
462 most climate feedbacks come into play in response to temperature change driven by the forcing,
463 not in direct response to the forcing. Thus, a model with ECS of 4°C takes twice as long to reach
464 full response as a model with ECS of 2°C, if the mixed layer provides the only heat capacity.
465 However, while the mixed layer is warming, there is exchange of water with the deeper ocean,
466 which slows the mixed layer warming. The longer response time with high ECS allows more of
467 the ocean to come into play. If mixing into the deeper ocean is approximated as diffusive, surface
468 temperature response time is proportional to the square of climate sensitivity.⁷⁸


469 Slow climate response accentuates need for the “anticipation” that E.E. David, Jr. spoke about. If
470 ECS is 4°C (1°C per W/m²), more warming is in the pipeline than widely assumed. GHG forcing
471 today already exceeds 4 W/m². Aerosols reduce the net forcing to about 3 W/m², based on IPCC
472 estimates (Section 5), but warming still in the pipeline for 3 W/m² forcing is 1.8°C, exceeding
473 warming realized to date (1.2°C). Slow feedbacks increase the equilibrium response even further
474 (Section 6). Large warmings can be avoided via a reasoned policy response, but definition of
475 effective policies will be aided by an understanding of climate response time.

476 3.1. Temperature response function

477 In the Bjerknes lecture⁷⁹ at the 2008 American Geophysical Union meeting, JEH argued that the
478 ocean in many⁸⁰ GCMs had excessive mixing, and he suggested that GCM groups all report the
479 response function of their models – the global temperature change versus time in response to
480 instant CO₂ doubling with the model run long enough to approach equilibrium. The response
481 function characterizes a climate model and enables a rapid estimate of the global mean surface
482 temperature change in response to any climate forcing scenario:

$$483 T_G(t) = \int [dT_G(t)/dt] dt = \int \lambda \times R(t) [dF_e/dt] dt. \quad (5)$$

484 T_G is the Green’s function estimate of global temperature at time t, λ (°C per W/m²) the model’s
485 equilibrium sensitivity, R the dimensionless temperature response function (% of equilibrium



486
487 Fig. 4. (a) Global mean surface temperature response to instant CO₂ doubling and (b) normalized
488 response function (percent of final change). Thick lines in Figs. 4 and 5 are smoothed⁸¹ results.


489 response), and dF_e the forcing change per unit time, dt . Integration over time begins when Earth
490 is in near energy balance, e.g., in preindustrial time. The response function yields an accurate
491 estimate of global temperature change for a forcing that does not cause reorganization of ocean
492 circulation. Accuracy of this approximation for temperature for one climate model is shown in
493 Chart 15 in the Bjerknes presentation and wider applicability has been demonstrated.⁸²

494 We study ocean mixing effects by comparing two GCMs: GISS (2014)⁸³ and GISS (2020),³⁵
495 both models⁸⁴ described by Kelley *et al.* (2020).³⁴ Ocean mixing is improved in GISS (2020) by
496 use of a high-order advection scheme,⁸⁵ finer upper-ocean vertical resolution (40 layers), updated
497 mesoscale eddy parameterization, and correction of errors in the ocean modeling code.³⁴ The
498 GISS (2020) model has improved variability, including the Madden-Julian Oscillation (MJO), El
499 Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO), but the spectrum of
500 ENSO-like variability is unrealistic and its amplitude is excessive, as shown by the magnitude of
501 oscillations in Fig. 4a. Ocean mixing in GISS (2020) may still be excessive in the North Atlantic,
502 where the model's simulated penetration of CFCs is greater than observed.⁸⁶

503 Despite reduced ocean mixing, the GISS (2020) model surface temperature response is no faster
504 than in the GISS (2014) model (Fig. 4b): it takes 100 years to reach within 1/e of the equilibrium
505 response. Slow response is partly explained by the larger ECS of the GISS (2020) model, which
506 is 3.5°C versus 2.7°C for the GISS (2014) model, but something more is going on in the newer
507 model, as exposed by the response function of Earth's energy imbalance.

508 3.2. Earth's energy imbalance (EEI)

509 When a forcing perturbs Earth's energy balance, the imbalance drives warming or cooling to
510 restore balance. Observed EEI is now about +1 W/m² (more energy coming in than going out)
511 averaged over several years.⁸⁷ High accuracy of EEI is obtained by tracking ocean warming – the
512 primary repository for excess energy – and adding heat stored in warming continents and heat
513 used in net melting of ice.⁸⁷ Heat storage in air adds an almost negligible amount. Radiation
514 balance measured from Earth-orbiting satellites cannot by itself define the absolute imbalance,



515
516 Fig. 5. (a) Earth's energy imbalance (EEI) for 2×CO₂, and (b) EEI normalized response function.

517 but, when calibrated with the *in situ* data, satellite Earth radiation budget observations provide
518 invaluable EEI data on finer temporal and spatial scales than the *in situ* data.⁸⁸

519 After a step-function forcing is imposed, EEI and global surface temperature must each approach
520 a new equilibrium, but EEI does so more rapidly, especially for the GISS (2020) model (Fig. 5).
521 EEI in GISS (2020) needs only a decade to reach within 1/e of full response (Fig. 5b), but global
522 surface temperature requires a century (Fig. 4b). Rapid decline of EEI – to half the forcing in 5
523 years (Fig. 5a) – has practical implications. First, EEI defines the rate heat is pumped into the
524 ocean, so if EEI is reduced, ocean warming is slowed. Second, rapid EEI decline implies that it is
525 wrong to assume that global warming can be stopped by a reduction of climate forcing by the
526 amount of EEI. Instead, the required reduction of forcing is larger than EEI. The difficulty in
527 finding additional reduction in climate forcing of even a few tenths of a W/m² is substantial.⁶⁸
528 Calculations that help quantify this matter are discussed in Supp. Material Sec. SM8.

529 What is the physics behind the fast response of EEI? The 2×CO₂ forcing and initial EEI are both
530 nominally 4 W/m². In the GISS (2014) model, the decline of EEI averaged over the first year is
531 0.5 W/m² (Fig. 5a), a moderate decline that might be largely caused by warming continents and
532 increased heat radiation to space. In contrast, EEI declines 1.3 W/m² in the GISS (2020) model
533 (Fig. 5a). Such a huge, immediate decline of EEI implies existence of an ultrafast climate
534 feedback. Climate feedbacks are the heart of climate change and warrant discussion.

535 3.3. Slow, fast and ultrafast feedbacks

536 Charney *et al.*⁴ described climate feedbacks without discussing time scales. At the 1982 Ewing
537 Symposium, water vapor, clouds and sea ice were described as “fast” feedbacks⁷ presumed to
538 change promptly in response to global temperature change, as opposed to “slow” feedbacks or
539 specified boundary conditions such as ice sheet size, vegetation cover, and atmospheric CO₂
540 amount, although it was noted that some specified boundary conditions, e.g., vegetation, in
541 reality may be capable of relatively rapid change.⁷

542 The immediate EEI response (Fig. 5a) implies a third feedback time scale: ultrafast. Ultrafast
543 feedbacks are not a new concept. When CO₂ is doubled, the added infrared opacity causes the

544 stratosphere to cool. Instant EEI upon CO₂ doubling is only $F_i = +2.5 \text{ W/m}^2$, but stratospheric
545 cooling quickly increases EEI to $+4 \text{ W/m}^2$.⁸⁹ All models calculate a similar radiative effect, so it
546 is useful to define an adjusted forcing, F_a , which is superior to F_i as a measure of climate forcing.
547 In contrast, if cloud change – the likely cause of the present ultrafast change – is lumped into the
548 adjusted forcing, each climate model has its own forcing, losing the merit of a common forcing.

549 Kamae *et al.*⁹⁰ review rapid cloud adjustment distinct from surface temperature-mediated
550 change. Clouds respond to radiative forcing, e.g., via effects on cloud particle phase, cloud
551 cover, cloud albedo and precipitation.⁹¹ The GISS (2020) model alters glaciation in stratiform
552 mixed-phase clouds, which increases supercooled water in stratus clouds, especially over the
553 Southern Ocean [Fig. 1 in the GCM description³⁴]. The portion of supercooled cloud water drops
554 goes from too little in GISS (2014) to too much in GISS (2020). Neither model simulates well
555 stratocumulus clouds, yet the models help expose real-world physics that affects climate
556 sensitivity and climate response time. Several models in CMIP6 comparisons find high ECS.⁹¹
557 For the sake of revealing the physics, it would be useful if the models defined their temperature
558 and EEI response functions. Model runs of even a decade can define the important part of Figs.
559 4a and 5a. Many short (e.g., 2-year) $2\times\text{CO}_2$ climate simulations with each run beginning at a
560 different point in the model's control run, could define cloud changes to an arbitrary accuracy. If
561 the EEI response is faster than the temperature response, it implies that the climate forcing
562 reduction required to stabilize climate is greater than EEI, as discussed in Supporting Material.
563 The need for better understanding of ultrafast feedbacks does not alter the high ECS inferred
564 from paleoclimate data. The main role of GCMs in the paleoclimate analyses that we use to
565 assess climate sensitivity is to define climate patterns, which allows more accurate assessment of
566 global temperature change from limited paleo data samples.^{53,54,56}

567 **4. CENOZOIC ERA**

568 In this section, we use data from ocean sediment cores to explore causes of climate change in the
569 past 66 million years. Based on theory and on knowledge of climate change in the past 800,000
570 years, we anticipate that CO₂ is the principal control knob on global temperature; with that
571 assumption, we quantify the CO₂ history required to account for Cenozoic temperature change.

572 Cenozoic climate allows us to investigate implications of high climate sensitivity and the danger
573 that climate models are less sensitive than the real world to a forcing such as CO₂. We refer to
574 GCMs, in general, and ice sheet modeling, in particular. Some proxy-based assessments of
575 Cenozoic CO₂ may be affected by a coupled GCM/ice sheet model finding that transition
576 between unglaciated and glaciated Antarctica occurs at 700-840 ppm CO₂.⁹² In addition, GCMs
577 have a long-standing difficulty in producing Pliocene warmth,⁹³ especially in the Arctic, without
578 large, probably unrealistic, GHG forcing. Our conclusion in Section 2 that (fast feedback) ECS is
579 high, $1.2^\circ\text{C} \pm 0.3^\circ\text{C}$ per W/m^2 , and our inference in Section 3 that amplifying cloud feedbacks
580 cause the ECS increase from 0.6°C to 1.2°C per W/m^2 , suggest that GCMs must simulate clouds
581 well to reproduce Cenozoic climate change. While we cannot develop cloud modeling here, we
582 can examine the effect of high ECS on interpretation of Cenozoic climate change.

583 Atmospheric CO₂ is a control knob⁹⁴ on Earth's temperature. CO₂ on glacial-interglacial time
584 scales is largely a feedback spurred by weak astronomical forcing, but Fig. 2 shows the tight

585 control that CO₂ maintains on those time scales. We obtain a more complete picture of CO₂ as a
586 forcing and feedback with aid of consistent calculations over the entire Cenozoic era.
587 Specifically, we use our derived ECS and a proxy (oxygen isotope) measure of deep ocean
588 temperature to infer a history of Earth’s surface temperature and atmospheric CO₂ throughout the
589 Cenozoic era. Progress has been made in proxy measurement of CO₂ via carbon isotopes in
590 alkenones and boron isotopes in planktic foraminifera,⁹⁵ yet there is still a wide scatter among
591 the results and fossil plant stomata tend to suggest smaller CO₂ amounts.⁹⁶

592 Proxy measures of CO₂ and indirect constraints on CO₂ based on oxygen isotopes need to work
593 in concert because of shortcomings in understanding of the physics of both the oxygen isotope
594 temperature proxy⁹⁷ and CO₂ proxies.⁹⁵ Merits of the oxygen isotope approach include high
595 temporal resolution and precision. We aim to show that deep ocean temperature change provides
596 a useful measure of surface temperature change and that the oxygen isotope proxy provides a
597 check on CO₂ proxies, as well as better understanding of Cenozoic climate change.


598 **4.1. Deep ocean temperature and sea level from δ¹⁸O**

599 Glacial-interglacial CO₂ oscillations (Fig. 2) involve exchange of carbon among surface carbon
600 reservoirs: the ocean, atmosphere, soil and biosphere. Total CO₂ in the reservoirs also can vary,
601 mainly on longer time scales, as carbon is exchanged with the solid Earth. CO₂ then becomes a
602 primary agent of long-term climate change, leaving orbital effects as “noise” on larger climate
603 swings. Oxygen isotopic composition of benthic (deep ocean dwelling) foraminifera shells
604 provides a starting point for analysis of Cenozoic temperature. Fig. 6 includes the recent high-
605 resolution record of Westerhold *et al.*⁹⁸ and data of Zachos *et al.*⁴⁷ that have been used for many
606 studies in the past quarter century. When Earth has negligible ice sheets, δ¹⁸O (¹⁸O amount
607 relative to a standard), provides an estimate of deep ocean temperature (right scale in Fig. 6)⁴⁷

$$608 \quad T_{do}(^{\circ}\text{C}) = -4 \delta^{18}\text{O} + 12. \quad (5)$$

609 This equation is used for the early Cenozoic, up to the large-scale glaciation of Antarctica at ~34
610 MyBP (Oi-1 in Fig. 6). At larger δ¹⁸O (colder climate), lighter ¹⁶O evaporates preferentially from
611 the ocean and accumulates in ice sheets. In Zachos data, δ¹⁸O increases by 3 between Oi-1 and
612 the LGM. Half of this δ¹⁸O change is due to the 6°C change of deep ocean temperature between
613 Oi-1 (5°C) and the LGM (–1°C).⁹⁹ The other 1.5 of δ¹⁸O change is presumed to be due to the
614 ~180 m sea level (SL) change between ice-free Earth and the LGM, with ~60 m from Antarctic
615 ice and 120 m from Northern Hemisphere ice. Thus, as an approximation to extract both SL and
616 T_{do} from δ¹⁸O, Hansen *et al.*⁷¹ assumed that SL rose linearly by 60 m as δ¹⁸O increased from
617 1.75 to 3.25 and linearly by 120 m as δ¹⁸O increased from 3.25 to 4.75.

618 As with most climate proxies, δ¹⁸O is fraught with complexities that affect interpretation.^{97,100}
619 Complications in the Cenozoic record are revealed by differences between the Zachos (Z) and
620 Westerhold (W) δ¹⁸O time series (Fig. 6). Despite complications, δ¹⁸O records carry a great
621 amount of information on climate change, and a simple linear analysis provides a useful
622 beginning. We modify prior equations⁷¹ because of differences between the Z and W data. For
623 example, the mid-Holocene (6-8 kyBP) values of δ¹⁸O in the Z and W data sets are δ¹⁸O_H^Z = 3.32
624 and δ¹⁸O_H^W = 3.88. Thus, sea level (SL) equations, relative to SL = 0 in the mid-Holocene, are:



625
 626 Fig. 6. Global deep ocean $\delta^{18}\text{O}$. Black line: Westerhold *et al.* (2020)⁹⁸ data in 5 kyr bins until 34
 627 MyBP and subsequently 2 kyr bins. Green line: Zachos *et al.* (2001)⁴⁷ data at 1 Myr resolution.
 628 Lower left: velocity¹⁰¹ of Indian tectonic plate. PETM = Paleocene Eocene Thermal Maximum;
 629 EECO = Early Eocene Climatic Optimum; Oi-1 marks the transition to glaciated Antarctica;
 630 MCO = Miocene Climatic Optimum; NAIP = North Atlantic Igneous Province.

631 $SL^Z(\text{m}) = 60 - 38.2 (\delta^{18}\text{O} - 1.75) \quad (\delta^{18}\text{O} < 3.32, \text{ maximum } SL = +60 \text{ m}), \quad (6)$

632 $SL^W(\text{m}) = 60 - 25.2 (\delta^{18}\text{O} - 1.5) \quad (\delta^{18}\text{O} < 3.88, \text{ maximum } SL = +60 \text{ m}), \quad (7)$

633 $SL^Z(\text{m}) = -120 (\delta^{18}\text{O} - 3.32)/1.58 \quad (\delta^{18}\text{O} > 3.32), \quad (8)$

634 $SL^W(\text{m}) = -120 (\delta^{18}\text{O} - 3.88)/1.42 \quad (\delta^{18}\text{O} > 3.88). \quad (9)$

635 The latter two equations are based on LGM $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ values $\delta^{18}\text{O}_{\text{LGM}}^Z = 4.9$ and $\delta^{18}\text{O}_{\text{LGM}}^W = 5.3$.
 636 Holocene and LGM deep ocean temperatures are specified as 1°C ¹⁰² and -1°C .⁹⁹ Coefficients in
 637 the equations are calculated as shown by the equation (11) example.


638 $T_{\text{do}}^Z(^\circ\text{C}) = 5 - 2.55 (\delta^{18}\text{O} - 1.75) \quad (1.75 < \delta^{18}\text{O} < 3.32), \quad (10)$

639 $T_{\text{do}}^Z(^\circ\text{C}) = 1 - 2 (\delta^{18}\text{O} - 3.32)/(4.9 - 3.32) = 1 - 1.27 (\delta^{18}\text{O} - 3.32) \quad (3.32 < \delta^{18}\text{O}), \quad (11)$

640 $T_{\text{do}}^W(^\circ\text{C}) = 6 - 2.10 (\delta^{18}\text{O} - 1.5) \quad (1.5 < \delta^{18}\text{O} < 3.88), \quad (12)$

641 $T_{\text{do}}^W(^\circ\text{C}) = 1 - 1.41 (\delta^{18}\text{O} - 3.88) \quad (3.88 < \delta^{18}\text{O}), \quad (13)$

642 Zachos and Westerhold $\delta^{18}\text{O}$, SL and T_{do} for the full Cenozoic, Pleistocene, and past 800,000
 643 years are graphed in Supp. Material and sea level is compared to data of Rohling *et al.*¹⁰³. We
 644 will focus on the W data, which has finer temporal resolution. We discuss differences between
 645 the W and Z data and interpretations of those differences at the end of Section 4.6.



646
 647 Fig. 7. (a) Ratio of ΔSST (latitude) to global T_s change for all ocean and the Atlantic Ocean,
 648 based on equilibrium response (years 4001-4500) in $2\times CO_2$ simulations of GISS (2020) model.
 649 (b) ΔT , the amount by which T_s change exceeds T_{do} change, based on an exponential fit to the
 650 two data points provided by the Holocene and LGM (see text).

651 4.2. Cenozoic T_s

652 In this section we combine the rich detail in T_{do} provided by benthic $\delta^{18}O$ with constraints on the
 653 range of Cenozoic T_s from surface proxies to produce an estimated history of Cenozoic T_s .

654 We expect T_{do} change, which derives from sea surface temperature (SST) at high latitudes where
 655 deepwater forms, to approximate T_s change when T_{do} is not near the freezing point. Global SST
 656 change understates global T_s (land plus ocean) change because land temperature response to a
 657 forcing exceeds SST response,¹⁰⁴ e.g., the equilibrium global SST response of the GISS (2020)
 658 GCM to $2\times CO_2$ is 70.6% of the global (land plus ocean) response. However, polar amplification
 659 of the SST response tends to compensate for SST undershoot of global T_s change. Compensation
 660 is nearly exact at latitudes of North Atlantic deepwater formation for $2\times CO_2$ climate change in
 661 the GISS (2020) climate model (Fig. 7a), but Southern Hemisphere polar amplification does not
 662 fully cover the 60-75 $^\circ S$ latitudes where Antarctic bottom water forms.


663 As T_{do} nears the freezing point, ice forms, adhering to the Antarctic continent, extending today to
 664 a depth of about 2 km, and also forming floating ice shelves. From the Holocene toward colder
 665 climate, the effect on temperature change is large: T_s declines 7 $^\circ C$ between the Holocene and
 666 LGM, but T_{do} declines only 2 $^\circ C$ (from 1 $^\circ C$ to -1 $^\circ C$). From the Holocene toward hotter climate,
 667 we expect a smaller effect that we can quantify by first neglecting the effect and finding how far
 668 we underestimate EECO temperature. Thus, as an initial approximation we assume $\Delta T_s = \Delta T_{do}$:

$$669 T_s \sim T_{do} - T_{doH} + 14^\circ C = T_{do} + 13^\circ C, \quad (\delta^{18}O < \delta^{18}O_H) \quad (14)$$

670 where we take Holocene T_s as 14 $^\circ C$ and T_{doH} as 1 $^\circ C$. In this initial approximation, we interpolate
 671 linearly for climate colder than the Holocene, the LGM being ~7 $^\circ C$ cooler than the Holocene:

$$672 T_s = 14^\circ C - 7^\circ C \times (\delta^{18}O - \delta^{18}O_H) / (\delta^{18}O_{LGM} - \delta^{18}O_H). \quad (\delta^{18}O > \delta^{18}O_H) \quad (15)$$

673 Resulting EECO (Early Eocene Climatic Optimum) T_s is ~27 $^\circ C$ for Westerhold $\delta^{18}O$ data (Fig.
 674 8a) and ~25 $^\circ C$ for Zachos data (Fig. S9).



675
 676 Fig. 8. Cenozoic temperature based on linear (equations 14 and 15) and nonlinear (equation 16)
 677 analyses. Antarctic Dome C data⁴³ (red) relative to last 1,000 years is multiplied by 0.6 to
 678 account for polar amplification and 14°C is added for absolute scale.

679 As expected, this initial (linear) approximation undershoots EECO T_s , which Zhu *et al.*¹⁰⁵ infer
 680 to be 29°C from a proxy-constrained full-field analysis using a GCM to account for the pattern
 681 of global temperature change. The moderate undershoot ($\Delta T = 2^\circ\text{C}$) of EECO T_s based on
 682 Westerhold data is consistent with the expectation that global warming of a few degrees would
 683 largely remove Antarctic ice shelves and allow polar amplification to fully cover regions of
 684 deepwater formation. Moreover, ΔT of 2°C at the Holocene and an additional 5°C between the
 685 Holocene and LGM are fit well by an exponential function between Antarctic glaciation and the
 686 LGM, as needed for ΔT to asymptote at the freezing point (Fig. 7b). Thus, we take T_s as


$$687 \quad T_s = T_{do} - \Delta T + 15^\circ\text{C} = T_{do} - 0.35(e^{0.8X} - 1) + 15^\circ\text{C}, \quad (16)$$

688 where $X = \delta^{18}\text{O} - \delta^{18}\text{O}_{\text{O}_i-1}$ and T_s is normalized to 14°C in the Holocene.

689 The result is a consistent analysis of global T_s for the entire Cenozoic (Fig. 8b). Oxygen isotope
 690 $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ of deep ocean foraminifera reproduces glacial-interglacial temperature change well; more
 691 detailed agreement is not expected as Antarctic ice core data are for a location that moves,
 692 especially in its altitude. Our interest is in warmer global climate and its relevance to upcoming
 693 human-caused climate change. For that purpose, we need to know the forcing that drove
 694 Cenozoic climate change. With the assumption that non- CO_2 GHG forcings provide 20% of the
 695 total GHG forcing, it is not difficult to infer the CO_2 abundance required to cause the Cenozoic
 696 temperature history in Fig. 8b. Considering the large disagreement among proxy CO_2 measures,
 697 this indirect measure of CO_2 via global T_s may provide the most accurate Cenozoic CO_2 history.

698 4.3. Cenozoic CO_2

699 We obtain the CO_2 history required to yield the Cenozoic T_s history from the relation



700
 701 Fig. 9. Cenozoic CO₂ estimated from $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ of Westerhold *et al.* (see text). Black lines are for
 702 ECS = 1.2°C per W/m²; red and green curves (ECS = 1.0 and 1.4°C per W/m²) are 1 My
 703 smoothed. Blue curves (last 800,000 years) are Antarctica ice core data.⁴⁴

704
$$\Delta F(t) = (T_s(t) - 14^\circ\text{C})/\text{ECS}, \quad (17)$$

705 where $\Delta F(t)$ (0 at 7 kyBP) includes changing solar irradiance and amplification of CO₂ forcing
 706 by non-CO₂ GHGs and ice sheets. The GHG amplification factor is taken as 1.25 throughout the
 707 Cenozoic (Section 2.6). The amplification applies to solar forcing as well as CO₂ forcing because
 708 it is caused by temperature change, not by CO₂. Solar irradiance is increasing 10% per billion
 709 years;⁷⁴ thus solar forcing (240 W/m² today) increases 2.4 W/m² per 100 million years. Thus,

710
$$\Delta F(t) = 1.25 \times [\Delta F_{\text{CO}_2}(t) + \Delta F_{\text{Sol}}(t)] \times A_s. \quad (\delta^{18}\text{O} > \delta^{18}\text{O}_H) \quad (18)$$

711 A_s , surface albedo amplification, is smaller in moving from the Holocene to warmer climate –
 712 when the main effect is shrinking of Antarctic ice – than toward colder climate. For $\delta^{18}\text{O} >$
 713 $\delta^{18}\text{O}_H$, we take A_s as its average value over the period from the Holocene to the LGM:

714
$$A_s = (F_{\text{Ice}} + F_{\text{GHG}})/F_{\text{GHG}} = (3.5 \text{ W/m}^2 + 2.25 \text{ W/m}^2)/(2.25 \text{ W/m}^2) = 2.55. \quad (\delta^{18}\text{O} > \delta^{18}\text{O}_H) \quad (19)$$

715 Thus, for climate colder than the Holocene,

716
$$\Delta F(t) = 3.19 \times [\Delta F_{\text{CO}_2}(t) + \Delta F_{\text{Sol}}(t)]. \quad (\delta^{18}\text{O} > \delta^{18}\text{O}_H) \quad (20)$$

717 For climate warmer than the Holocene up to O_{i-1} , i.e., for $\delta^{18}\text{O}_{\text{O}_{i-1}} < \delta^{18}\text{O} < \delta^{18}\text{O}_H$,

718
$$\Delta F(t) = 1.25 \times [\Delta F_{\text{CO}_2}(t) + \Delta F_{\text{Sol}}(t) + F_{\text{IceH}} \times (\delta^{18}\text{O}_H - \delta^{18}\text{O}) / (\delta^{18}\text{O}_H - \delta^{18}\text{O}_{\text{O}_{i-1}})]. \quad (21)$$

719 F_{IceH} , the (Antarctic plus Greenland) ice sheet forcing between the Holocene and O_{i-1} , is
 720 estimated to be 2 W/m² (Fig. S4, *Target CO₂*). For climate warmer than O_{i-1}

721
$$\Delta F(t) = 1.25 \times [\Delta F_{\text{CO}_2} + \Delta F_{\text{Sol}}(t) + \Delta F_{\text{IceH}}]. \quad (22)$$


722 All quantities are known except $\Delta F_{\text{CO}_2}(t)$, which is thus defined. Cenozoic CO_2 (t) for specified
723 ECS is obtained from $T_S(t)$ using the CO_2 radiative forcing equation (Table 1, Supp. Material).
724 We use the Westerhold T_S history, Fig. 8b. Resulting CO_2 (Fig. 9) is about 1,200 ppm in the
725 EECO, 450 ppm at Oi-1, and 325 ppm in the Pliocene for the most probable ECS (1.2°C per
726 W/m^2). These values depend on ECS and the assumption that non- CO_2 gases provide 20% of the
727 GHG forcing, but our lowest value for ECS (1°C per W/m^2) leaves Pliocene CO_2 near 350 ppm,
728 rising only to ~ 500 ppm at Oi-1 and ~ 1500 ppm at EECO.

729 Assumed Holocene CO_2 amount is also a minor factor. We tested two cases: 260 and 278 ppm
730 (Fig. 9). These were implemented as the CO_2 values at 7 kyBP, but Holocene-mean values are
731 similar – a few ppm less than CO_2 at 7 kyBP. Holocene = 278 ppm increases CO_2 about 20 ppm
732 between today and Oi-1, and about 50 ppm at the EECO. However, Holocene CO_2 278 ppm
733 causes the amplitude of inferred glacial-interglacial CO_2 oscillations to be less than reality (Fig.
734 9b), providing support for the Holocene 260 ppm level and for the interpretation that high late-
735 Holocene CO_2 was due to human influence. Proxy measures of Cenozoic CO_2 yield a notoriously
736 large range. A recent review⁹⁵ constructs a CO_2 history with Loess-smoothed $\text{CO}_2 \sim 700\text{--}1100$
737 ppm at Oi-1. That high Oi-1 CO_2 amount is not plausible without overthrowing the concept that
738 global temperature is a response to climate forcings. More generally, we conclude that actual
739 CO_2 during the Cenozoic was near the low end of the range of proxy measurements.

740 **4.4. Interpretation of Cenozoic T_S and CO_2**

741 In this section we consider Cenozoic T_S and CO_2 histories, which are rich in insights about
742 climate change with implications for future climate.

743 In *Target CO_2* ⁶⁵ and elsewhere¹⁰⁶ we argue that the broad sweep of Cenozoic temperature is a
744 result of plate tectonic (popularly “continental drift”) effects on CO_2 . Solid Earth sources and
745 sinks of CO_2 are not balanced at any given time. CO_2 is removed from surface reservoirs by: (1)
746 chemical weathering of rocks with deposition of carbonates on the ocean floor, and (2) burial of
747 organic matter.^{107,108} CO_2 returns via metamorphism and volcanic outgassing at locations where
748 oceanic crust is subducted beneath moving continental plates. The interpretation in *Target CO_2*
749 was that the main Cenozoic source of CO_2 was associated with the Indian plate (Fig. 10), which
750 separated from Pangea in the Cretaceous^{109,110} and moved through the Tethys (now Indian)
751 Ocean at a rate exceeding 10 cm/year until collision with the Eurasian plate at circa 50 MyBP.
752 Associated CO_2 emissions include those from formation of the Deccan Traps¹¹¹ in western India,
753 a large igneous province (LIP) formed by repeated deposition of large-scale flood basalts, the
754 smaller Rajahmundry Traps¹¹² in eastern India, and metamorphism and vulcanism associated
755 with the moving Indian plate. The Indian plate slowed circa 60 Mya (inset, Fig. 6) before
756 resuming high speed,¹⁰¹ leaving an indelible signature in the Cenozoic $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ history (Fig. 6) that
757 supports our interpretation of the CO_2 source. Since the continental collision, subduction and
758 CO_2 emissions continue at a diminishing rate as the India plate underthrusts the Asian continent
759 and pushes up the Himalayan mountains.¹¹³ We interpret the decline of CO_2 over the past 50
760 million years as, at least in part, a decline of the metamorphic source from continued subduction
761 of the Indian plate, but burial of organic matter and increased weathering due to exposure of
762 fresh rock by Himalayan uplift¹¹⁴ may contribute to CO_2 drawdown. Quantitative understanding
763 of these processes is limited,¹¹⁵ e.g., weathering is both a source and sink of CO_2 .¹¹⁶




764

765 Fig. 10. Continental configuration 56 MyBP.¹¹⁷ Continental shelves (light blue) were underwater
 766 as little water was locked in ice. The Indian plate was moving north at about 15 cm per year.

767 This picture for the broad sweep of Cenozoic CO₂ is consistent with current understanding of the
 768 long-term carbon cycle,¹¹⁸ but relative contributions of metamorphism¹¹⁵ and volcanism¹¹⁹ are
 769 uncertain. Also, emissions from rift-induced Large Igneous Provinces (LIPs)^{120,121} contribute to
 770 long-term change of atmospheric CO₂, with two cases prominent in Fig. 6. The Columbia River
 771 Flood Basalt at ca. 17-15 MyBP was a principal cause of the Miocene Climatic Optimum,¹²² but
 772 the processes are poorly understood.¹²³ A more dramatic event occurred as Greenland separated
 773 from Europe, causing a rift in the sea floor; flood basalt covered more than a million square
 774 kilometers with magma volume 6-7 million cubic kilometers¹²¹ – the North Atlantic Igneous
 775 Province (NAIP). Flood basalt volcanism occurred during 60.5-54.5 MyBP, but at 56.1 ± 0.5
 776 MyBP melt production increased by more than a factor of 10, continued at a high level for about
 777 a million years, and then subsided (Fig. 5 of Storey *et al.*).¹²⁴ The striking Paleocene-Eocene
 778 Thermal Maximum (PETM) δ¹⁸O spike (Fig. 6) occurs early in this million-year bump-up of
 779 δ¹⁸O. Svensen *et al.*¹²⁵ proposed that the PETM was initiated by the massive flood basalt into
 780 carbon-rich sedimentary strata. Gutjahr *et al.*¹²⁶ developed an isotope analysis, concluding that
 781 most of PETM carbon emissions were volcanic, with climate-driven carbon feedbacks playing a
 782 lesser role. Yet other evidence,¹²⁷ while consistent with volcanism as a trigger for the PETM,
 783 suggests that climate feedback – perhaps methane hydrate release – may have caused more than
 784 half of the PETM warming. We discuss PETM warming and CO₂ levels below, but first we must
 785 quantify the mechanisms that drove Cenozoic climate change and consider where Earth's climate
 786 was headed before humanity intervened.

787 The sum of climate forcings (CO₂ and solar) and slow feedbacks (ice sheets and non-CO₂ GHGs)
 788 that maintained EECO warmth was 12.5 W/m² (Fig. 11). CO₂ forcing of 9.1 W/m² combined
 789 with solar forcing of – 1.2 W/m² to yield a total forcing¹²⁸ 8 W/m². Slow feedbacks were 4.5
 790 W/m² forcing (ice albedo = 2 W/m² and non-CO₂ GHGs = 2.5 W/m²). With today's solar
 791 irradiance, human-made GHG forcing required for Earth to return to EECO warmth is 8 W/m².
 792 Present human-made GHG forcing is 4.6 W/m² relative to 7 kyBP.¹²⁹ Equilibrium response to
 793 this forcing includes the 2 W/m² ice sheet feedback and 25% amplification (of 6.6 W/m²) by



794
795 Fig. 11. Climate forcings and slow feedbacks relative to 7 kyBP from terms in equations (20-22).


796 non-CO₂ GHGs, yielding a total forcing plus slow feedbacks of 8.25 W/m². Thus, equilibrium
797 global warming for today's GHGs is 10°C.¹³⁰ If human-made aerosol forcing is -1.5 W/m² and
798 remains at that level indefinitely, equilibrium warming for today's atmosphere is reduced to 8°C.
799 Either 10°C or 8°C dwarfs observed global warming of 1.2°C to date. Most of the equilibrium
800 warming for today's atmosphere has not yet occurred, and need not occur (Section 6.5).

801 4.5 Prospects for another Snowball Earth

802 We would be remiss if we did not comment on the precipitous decline of Earth's temperature
803 over the last several million years. Was Earth falling off the table into another Snowball Earth?

804 Global temperature plummeted in the past 50 million years, with growing, violent, oscillations
805 (Figs. 6 and 7). Glacial-interglacial average CO₂ declined from about 325 ppm to 225 ppm in the
806 past five million years in an accelerating decline (Fig. 9a). As CO₂ fell to 180 ppm in recent
807 glacial maxima, an ice sheet covered most of Canada and reached midlatitudes in the U.S.
808 Continents in the current supercontinent cycle¹⁰⁹ are now dispersed, with movement slowing to
809 2-3 cm/year. Emissions from the last high-speed high-impact tectonic event – collision of the
810 Indian plate with Eurasia – are fizzling out. The most recent large igneous province (LIP) event –
811 the Columbia River Flood Basalt about 15 million years ago (Fig. 6) – is no longer a factor, and
812 there is no evidence of another impending LIP. Snowball conditions are possible, even though
813 the Sun's brightness is increasing and is now almost 6% greater⁷⁴ than it was at the last snowball
814 Earth, almost 600 million years ago.⁷³ Runaway snowball likely requires only 1-2 halvings⁷¹ of
815 CO₂ from the LGM 180 ppm level, i.e., to 45-90 ppm. Although the weathering rate declines in
816 colder climate,¹³¹ weathering and burial of organic matter continue, so decrease of atmospheric
817 CO₂ could have continued over millions of years, if the source of CO₂ from metamorphism and
818 vulcanism continued to decline.

819 Thus, in the absence of human activity, Earth may have been headed for snowball Earth
820 conditions within the next 10 or 20 million years. However, chance of future snowball Earth is
821 now academic. Human-made GHG emissions remove that possibility on any time scale of
822 practical interest. Instead, GHG emissions are now driving Earth toward much warmer climate.



823
 824 Fig. 12. Temperature and CO₂ implied by δ¹⁸O, if surface warming equaled deep ocean warming.
 825 However, PETM surface warming of 5.6°C based on proxy surface temperature data yields peak
 826 PETM CO₂ = 1630 ppm (see text).

827 4.6. Paleocene Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM)

828 The PETM event provides an invaluable benchmark for assessing the impact of the human-made
 829 climate perturbation, as well as the time scale for natural recovery of the climate system.

830 Westerhold data have 10°C deep ocean warming at the PETM, which exceeds warming in proxy
 831 surface temperature data. Low latitude SST data have 3-4°C PETM warming.¹³² GCM-assisted
 832 data assimilation accounting for patterns of climate change yields PETM global surface warming
 833 5.6°C (5.4-5.9°C, 95% confidence)¹³³. The simplest interpretation is that both results are correct,
 834 i.e., deep ocean warming at the sampled sites exceeded surface warming during the singular
 835 PETM event. Nunes and Norris¹³⁴ conclude that ocean circulation changed at the start of the
 836 PETM with a shift in location of deep-water formation that delivered warmer waters to the deep
 837 sea, a circulation change that persisted at least 40,000 years. The PETM was triggered by a rift in
 838 the sea floor with massive lave injection into the North Atlantic, so it is not surprising that deep
 839 ocean temperature was elevated and circulation disrupted during the PETM.

840 We use the 5.6°C global surface warming estimate of Tierney *et al.*¹³³ and the pre-PETM T_s and
 841 CO₂ from our analysis (Fig. 12) to obtain peak PETM CO₂. With the most likely ECS (1.2°C per
 842 W/m²), pre-PETM (56-56.4 MyBP) CO₂ is 910 ppm and peak PETM CO₂ is 1630 ppm if CO₂
 843 provides 80% of the GHG forcing, thus less than a doubling of CO₂. (In the unlikely case that
 844 CO₂ caused 100% of the GHG forcing, required CO₂ is 1780, still not quite a doubling.) CO₂
 845 amounts for ECS = 1.0 and 1.4°C per W/m² are 1165 and 760 ppm in the pre-PETM and 2260
 846 and 1270 ppm at peak PETM, respectively. In all these ECS cases, the CO₂ forcing of the PETM
 847 is less than or approximately a CO₂ doubling. Our assumed 20% contribution by non-CO₂ GHGs
 848 (amplification factor 1.25, Section 2), is nominal; indeed, Hopcroft *et al.*, e.g., estimate a 30%
 849 contribution from non-CO₂ GHGs,¹³⁵ thus an amplification factor 1.43.

850 GHG forcing that drove PETM warming, therefore, was less than or about that for CO₂ doubling
 851 (~4 W/m²), less than today's estimated GHG climate forcing (4.6 W/m²) that is still growing 0.5
 852 W/m² per decade. The PETM is relevant to policy considerations, but we must bear in mind two
 853 differences between the PETM and human-made climate change. First, there were no large ice
 854 sheets on Earth in the PETM era. Ice sheets on Antarctica and Greenland today make Earth
 855 system sensitivity (ESS) greater than it was during the PETM. Equilibrium response to today's
 856 human-made climate forcing would include deglaciation of Antarctica and Greenland, sea level


857 rise of 60 m (about 200 feet), and surface albedo forcing of 2 W/m². The second difference
858 between the PETM and today is the rate of change of the climate forcing. Most of today's
859 climate forcing was introduced in a century, which is 10 times or more faster than the PETM
860 forcing growth. Although a bolide impact¹³⁶ has been proposed as a trigger for the PETM, the
861 issue is the time scale on which the climate forcing – increased GHGs – occurred. Despite
862 uncertainty in the carbon source(s), data and modeling point to duration of a millennium or more
863 for PETM emissions.^{132,137}

864 Better understanding of the PETM could inform us on climate feedbacks. Gutjahr *et al.*¹²⁶ argue
865 persuasively that PETM emissions were mostly volcanic, yet we know of no other large igneous
866 province that produced such great, temporally-isolated emissions. Further, numerous Cenozoic
867 hyperthermal events¹³⁸ testify to important contributions of feedbacks to CO₂ amount. Northern
868 peatlands today contain more than 1000 Gt carbon,¹³⁹ much of which could be mobilized at
869 PETM warming levels.¹⁴⁰ The double peak in deep ocean δ¹⁸O (thus in inferred temperatures, cf.
870 Fig. 12, where each square is a binning interval of 5,000 years) is also found in terrestrial data.¹⁴¹
871 Perhaps the sea floor rift occurred in two bursts, or the rift was followed tens of thousands of
872 years later by methane hydrate release as a feedback to the ocean warming; much of today's
873 methane hydrate is in stratigraphic deposits hundreds of meters below the sea floor, where
874 millennia may pass before a thermal wave from the surface reaches the deposits.¹⁴² Emissions
875 from such feedbacks, including permafrost, seem to be more chronic than catastrophic on the
876 short-term, but if policies are not designed to terminate growth of these feedbacks (Section 6), it
877 may become impossible to avoid climate catastrophe.

878 The PETM draws attention to differences between the Westerhold and Zachos δ¹⁸O data. The
879 PETM warming of 10°C in W data is twice as large as that in Z data. Zachos attributes the larger
880 PETM response in W data to the shallow (less than 1 km) depth of the Walvis Ridge core that
881 covers the PETM period in the W data, while Westerhold points out the affect of modern
882 analytical techniques that affect the amplitude of Cenozoic temperature change (see Supp.
883 Material SM9). Differences between the W and Z data sets have limited effect on conclusions of
884 our paper, as we reduce differences via scaling (equations 6-13) for agreement at the LGM, mid-
885 Holocene, and Oi-1 points. This approach addresses, e.g., the cumulative effect in combining
886 data splices noted by Zachos in SM9. Further, we set the EECO global temperature relative to the
887 Holocene and the PETM temperature relative to pre-PETM based on proxy-constrained, full-
888 field, GCM analyses of Tierney *et al.*¹³³ and Zhu *et al.*¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, improved understanding
889 of the differences between the W and Z data is needed. Potential insights from the PETM are
890 especially important, given the comparable magnitude of human-made and PETM climate
891 forcings. The PETM provides perhaps the best empirical check on understanding of the
892 atmospheric lifetime of fossil fuel CO₂,¹⁴³ but for that purpose we must untangle as well as
893 possible the time dependence of the PETM CO₂ source and feedbacks. If a continuing magma
894 flow is a substantial portion of PETM CO₂, it may lead to exaggeration of CO₂ lifetime.

895 Policy discussion requires also an understanding of the role of aerosols in climate change.

896



897
 898 Fig. 13. Observed global surface temperature (black line) and expected GHG warming with two
 899 choices for ECS. The blue area is the estimated aerosol cooling effect. The temperature peak in
 900 the World War II era is in part an artifact of inhomogeneous ocean data in that period.⁶⁸

901 5. AEROSOLS


902 The role of aerosols in climate change is uncertain because aerosol properties are not measured
 903 well enough to define their climate forcing. In this section we find ways to estimate the climate
 904 forcing via aerosol effects on Earth’s temperature and Earth’s energy imbalance.

905 Aerosol impact is suggested by the gap between observed global warming and expected warming
 906 due to GHGs based on ECS inferred from paleoclimate (Fig. 13). Expected warming is from Eq.
 907 4 with the normalized response function of the GISS (2020) model. Our best estimate for ECS,
 908 1.2°C per W/m², yields a gap of 1.5°C between expected and actual warming in 2022. Aerosols
 909 are the likely cooling source. The other negative forcing discussed by IPCC – surface albedo
 910 change – is estimated by IPCC (Chapter 7, Table 7.8) to be -0.12 ± 0.1 W/m², an order of
 911 magnitude smaller than aerosol forcing.¹³ Thus, for clarity, we focus on GHGs and aerosols.

912 Absence of global warming over the 70-year period 1850-1920 (Fig. SPM.1 of IPCC AR6 WG1
 913 report¹³) is a clue about aerosol forcing. GHG forcing increased 0.54 W/m² in 1850-1920, which
 914 causes an expected warming $\sim 0.4^\circ\text{C}$ by 1920 for ECS = 1°C per W/m². Natural forcings – solar
 915 irradiance and volcanic aerosols – might contribute to lack of warming, but no persuasive case
 916 has been made for the required downward trends of those forcings. Human-made aerosols are the
 917 likely offset of GHG warming. Such aerosol cooling is a Faustian bargain¹⁰⁶ because payment in
 918 enhanced global warming will come due once we can no longer tolerate the air pollution.
 919 Ambient air pollution causes millions of deaths per year, with particulates most responsible.¹⁴⁴

920 5.1. Evidence of aerosol forcing in the Holocene


921 In this section we infer evidence of human-made aerosols in the last half of the Holocene from
 922 the absence of global warming. Some proxy-based analyses¹⁴⁵ report cooling in the last half of
 923 the Holocene, but a recent analysis⁵⁴ that uses GCMs to overcome spatial and temporal biases in
 924 proxy data finds rising global temperature in the first half of the Holocene followed by nearly




925
926 Fig. 14. Global mean surface temperature change over the past 24 ky, reproduced from Fig. 2 of
927 Osman et al.⁵⁴ including Last Millennium reanalysis of Tardif *et al.*¹⁴⁶

928 constant temperature in the last 6,000 years until the last few centuries (Fig. 14). Antarctic, deep
929 ocean, and tropical sea surface data all show stable temperature in the last 6,000 years (Fig. S6 of
930 reference⁶⁵). GHG forcing increased 0.5 W/m^2 during those 6,000 years (Fig. 15), yet Earth did
931 not warm. Fast feedbacks alone should yield at least $+0.5^\circ\text{C}$ warming and 6,000 years is long
932 enough for slow feedbacks to also contribute. How can we interpret the absence of warming?

933 Humanity's growing footprint deserves scrutiny. Ruddiman's suggestion that deforestation and
934 agriculture began to affect CO_2 6500 year ago and rice agriculture began to affect CH_4 5,000
935 years ago has been criticized⁵⁰ mainly because of the size of proposed sources. Ruddiman sought
936 sources sufficient to offset declines of CO_2 and CH_4 in prior interglacial periods, but such large
937 sources are not needed to account for Holocene GHG levels. Paleoclimate GHG decreases are
938 slow feedbacks that occur in concert with global cooling. However, if global cooling did not
939 occur in the past 6,000 years, feedbacks did not occur. Earth orbital parameters 6,000 years ago
940 kept the Southern Ocean warm, as needed to maintain strong overturning ocean circulation¹⁴⁷
941 and minimize carbon sequestration in the deep ocean. Maximum insolation at 60°S was in late-



942
943 Fig. 15. GHG climate forcing in past 20 ky with vertical scale expanded for the past 10 ky on the
944 right. GHG amounts are from Schilt *et al.*⁵¹ and formulae for forcing are in Supporting Material.



945

946 Fig. 16. Sea level since the last glacial period relative to present. Credit: Robert Rohde¹⁴⁸


947 spring (mid-November); since then, maximum insolation at 60°S slowly advanced through the
 948 year, recently reaching mid-summer (mid-January, Fig. 26b of *Ice Melt*¹⁴). Maximum insolation
 949 from late-spring through mid-summer is optimum to warm the Southern Ocean and promote
 950 early warm-season ice melt, which reduces surface albedo and magnifies regional warming.⁴⁸

951 GHG forcing of -0.2 W/m^2 in 10-6 kyBP (Fig. 15) was exceeded by forcing of $+1 \text{ W/m}^2$ due to
 952 ice sheet shrinkage (Supp. Material in *Target CO₂*⁶⁵) for a 40 m sea level rise (Fig. 16). Net 0.8
 953 W/m^2 forcing produced expected 1°C global warming (Fig. 14). The mystery is the absence of
 954 warming in the past 6,000 years. Hansen *et al.*⁴⁸ suggested that aerosol cooling offset GHG
 955 warming. Growing population, agriculture and land clearance produced aerosols and CO₂; wood
 956 was the main fuel for cooking and heating. Nonlinear aerosol forcing is largest in a pristine
 957 atmosphere, so it is unsurprising that aerosols tended to offset CO₂ warming as civilization
 958 developed. Hemispheric differences could provide a check. GHG forcing is global, while aerosol
 959 forcing is mainly in the Northern Hemisphere. Global offset implies a net negative Northern
 960 Hemisphere forcing and positive Southern Hemisphere forcing. Thus, data and modeling studies
 961 (including orbital effects) of regional response are warranted but beyond the scope of this paper.

962 5.2. Industrial era aerosols

963 Scientific advances often face early resistance from other scientists.¹⁴⁹ Examples are the
 964 snowball Earth hypothesis¹⁵⁰ and the role of an asteroid impact in extinction of non-avian
 965 dinosaurs,¹⁵¹ which initially were highly controversial but are now more widely accepted.
 966 Ruddiman's hypothesis, right or wrong, is still controversial. Thus, we minimize this issue by
 967 showing aerosol effects with and without preindustrial human-made aerosols.

968 Global aerosols are not monitored with detail needed to define aerosol climate forcing.^{152,153}
 969 IPCC¹³ estimates forcing (Fig. 17a) from assumed precursor emissions, a herculean task due to
 970 many aerosol types and complex cloud effects. Aerosol forcing uncertainty is comparable to its
 971 estimated value (Fig. 17a), which is constrained more by observed global temperature change
 972 than by aerosol measurements.¹⁵⁴ IPCC's best estimate of aerosol forcing (Fig. 107) and GHG



973
 974 Fig. 17. (a) Estimated greenhouse gas and aerosol forcings relative to 1750 values. (b) Aerosol forcing as
 975 percent of GHG forcing. Forcings for dark blue area are relative to 1750. Light blue area adds 0.5 W/m²
 976 forcing estimated for human-caused aerosols from fires, biofuels and land use.

977 history define the percent of GHG forcing offset by aerosol cooling – the dark blue area in Fig.
 978 17b. However, if human-made aerosol forcing was -0.5 W/m^2 by 1750, offsetting $+0.5 \text{ W/m}^2$
 979 GHG forcing, this forcing should be included. Such aerosol forcing – largely via effects of land
 980 use and biomass fuels on clouds – continues today. Thirty million people in the United States use
 981 wood for heating.¹⁵⁵ Such fuels are also common in Europe^{156,157} and much of the world.


982 Fig. 17b encapsulates two alternative views of aerosol history. IPCC aerosol forcing slowly
 983 becomes important relative to GHG forcing. In our view, civilization always produced aerosols
 984 as well as GHGs. As sea level stabilized, organized societies and population grew as coastal
 985 biologic productivity increased¹⁵⁸ and agriculture developed. Wood was the main fuel. Aerosols
 986 travel great distances, as shown by Asian aerosols in North America.¹⁵⁹ Humans contributed to
 987 both rising GHG and aerosol climate forcings in the past 6,000 years. One result is that human-
 988 caused aerosol climate forcing is at least 0.5 W/m^2 more than usually assumed. Thus, the
 989 Faustian payment that will eventually come due is also larger, as discussed in Section 6.

990 5.3. Ambiguity in aerosol climate forcing

991 In this section we discuss uncertainty in the aerosol forcing. We discuss why global warming in
 992 the past century – often used to infer climate sensitivity – is ill-suited for that purpose.

993 Recent global warming does not yield a unique ECS because warming depends on three major
 994 unknowns with only two basic constraints. Unknowns are ECS, net climate forcing (aerosol
 995 forcing is unmeasured), and ocean mixing (many ocean models are too diffusive). Constraints
 996 are observed global temperature change and Earth's energy imbalance (EEI).⁸⁷ Knutti¹⁶⁰ and
 997 Hansen⁷⁹ suggest that many climate models compensate for excessive ocean mixing (which
 998 reduces surface warming) by using aerosol forcing less negative than the real world, thus
 999 achieving realistic surface warming. This issue is unresolved and complicated by the finding that
 1000 cloud feedbacks can buffer ocean heat uptake (Section 3), affecting interpretation of EEI.


1001 IPCC AR6 WG1 best estimate of aerosol forcing (Table AIII.3)¹³ is near maximum (negative)
 1002 value by 1975, then nearly constant until rising in the 21st century to -1.09 W/m^2 in 2019 (Fig.
 1003 18). We use this IPCC aerosol forcing in climate simulations here. We also use an alternative
 1004 aerosol scenario¹⁶¹ that reaches -1.63 W/m^2 in 2010 relative to 1880 and -1.8 W/m^2 relative to
 1005 1850 (Fig. 18) based on modeling of Koch¹⁶² that included changing technology factors defined
 1006 by Novakov.¹⁶³ This alternative scenario¹⁶⁴ is comparable to the forcing in some current aerosol




1007
 1008 Fig. 18. Aerosol forcing relative to 1850 from IPCC AR6, an alternative aerosol scenario¹⁶¹ and
 1009 two aerosol model scenarios of Bauer et al. (2020).¹⁶⁵

1010 models (Fig. 18). Human-made aerosol forcing relative to several millennia ago may be even
 1011 more negative, by about -0.5 W/m^2 as discussed above, but the additional forcing was offset by
 1012 increasing GHGs and thus those additional forcings are neglected, with climate assumed to be in
 1013 approximate equilibrium in 1850.

1014 Many combinations of climate sensitivity and aerosol forcing can fit observed global warming.
 1015 The GISS (2014) model ($\text{ECS} = 2.6^\circ\text{C}$) with IPCC AR6 aerosol forcing can match observed
 1016 warming (Fig. 19) in the last half century (when human-made climate forcing overwhelmed
 1017 natural forcings, unforced climate variability, and flaws in observations). However, agreement
 1018 also can be achieved by climate models with high ECS. The GISS (2020) model (with $\text{ECS} =$
 1019 3.5°C) yields greater warming than observed if IPCC aerosol forcing is used, but less than
 1020 observed for the alternative aerosol scenario (Fig. 19). This latter aerosol scenario achieves
 1021 agreement with observed warming if $\text{ECS} \sim 4^\circ\text{C}$ (green curve in Fig. 19).¹⁶⁶ Agreement can be
 1022 achieved with even higher ECS by use of a still more negative aerosol forcing.



1023
 1024 Fig. 19. Global temperature change T_G due to aerosols + GHGs calculated with Green's function
 1025 Eq (5) using GISS (2014) and GISS (2020) response functions (Fig. 4). Observed temperature is
 1026 the NASA GISS analysis.^{167,168} Base period: 1951-1980 for observations and model.




1027
1028 Fig. 20. Total sulfate (parts per trillion by volume) and percentage of total sulfate provided by
1029 shipping in simulations of Jin *et al.*¹⁶⁹ prior to IMO regulations on sulfur content of fuels.

1030 The issue we raise is the magnitude of the aerosol forcing, with implications for future warming
1031 when particulate air pollution is likely to be reduced. We suggest that IPCC reports may have
1032 gravitated toward climate sensitivity near 3°C for 2×CO₂ in part because of difficulty that
1033 models have in realistically simulating amplifying cloud feedbacks and a climate model tendency
1034 for excessive mixing of heat into the deep ocean. Our finding from paleoclimate analysis that
1035 ECS is 1.2°C ± 0.3°C per W/m² (4.8°C ± 1.2°C for 2×CO₂) implies that the (unmeasured)
1036 aerosol forcing must be more negative than IPCC’s best estimate. In turn – because aerosol-
1037 cloud interactions are the main source of uncertainty in aerosol forcing – this finding emphasizes
1038 the need to measure both global aerosol and cloud particle properties.

1039 The case for monitoring global aerosol climate forcing will grow as recognition of the need to
1040 slow and reverse climate change emerges. Aerosol and cloud particle microphysics must be
1041 measured with precision adequate to define the forcing.^{170,152} In the absence of such Keeling-like
1042 global monitoring, progress can be made via more limited satellite measurements of aerosol and
1043 cloud properties, field studies, and aerosol and cloud modeling. As described next, a great
1044 opportunity to study aerosol and cloud physics is provided by a recent change in the IMO
1045 (International Maritime Organization) regulations on ship emissions.

1046 **5.4. The great inadvertent aerosol experiment**

1047 Sulfate aerosols are cloud condensation nuclei (CCN), so sulfate emissions by ships result in a
1048 larger number of smaller cloud particles, thus affecting cloud albedo and cloud lifetime.¹⁷¹ Ships
1049 provide a large percentage of sulfates in the North Pacific and North Atlantic regions (Fig. 20). It
1050 has been suggested that cooling by these clouds is overestimated because of cloud liquid water
1051 adjustments,¹⁷² but Manshausen *et al.*¹⁷³ present evidence that liquid water path (LWP) effects
1052 are substantial even in regions without visible ship-tracks; they estimate a LWP forcing $-0.76 \pm$
1053 0.27 W/m², in stark contrast with the IPCC estimate of $+0.2 \pm 0.2$ W/m². Wall *et al.*¹⁷⁴ use
1054 satellite observations to quantify relationships between sulfates and low-level clouds; they
1055 estimate a sulfate indirect aerosol forcing of -1.11 ± 0.43 W/m² over the global ocean. The
1056 range of aerosol forcings used in CMIP6 and AR6 GCMs (small blue bar in Fig. 18) is not a
1057 measure of aerosol forcing uncertainty. The larger bar, from Chapter 7¹⁷⁵ of AR6, has negative
1058 forcing as great as -2 W/m², but even that does not measure the full uncertainty.




1059
 1060 Fig. 21. Global absorbed solar radiation (W/m^2) relative to mean of the first 120 months of
 1061 CERES data. CERES data are available at http://ceres.larc.nasa.gov/order_data.php

1062 Changes of IMO emission regulations provide a great opportunity for insight into aerosol climate
 1063 forcing. Sulfur content of fuels was limited to 1% in 2010 near the coasts of North America and
 1064 in the North Sea, Baltic Sea and English Channel, and further restricted there to 0.1% in 2015.¹⁷⁶
 1065 In 2020 a limit of 0.5% was imposed worldwide. The 1% limit did not have a noticeable effect
 1066 on ship-tracks, but a striking reduction of ship-tracks was found after the 2015 IMO regulations,
 1067 especially in the regions near land where emissions were specifically limited.¹⁷⁷ Following the
 1068 additional 2020 regulations,¹⁷⁸ global ship-tracks were reduced more than 50%.¹⁷⁹

1069 Earth's albedo (reflectivity) measured by CERES (Clouds and Earth's Radiant Energy System)
 1070 satellite-borne instruments⁸⁸ over the 22-years March 2000 to March 2022 reveal a decrease of
 1071 albedo and thus an increase of absorbed solar energy coinciding with the 2015 change of IMO
 1072 emission regulations. Global absorbed solar energy is $+1.05 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$ in the period January 2015
 1073 through December 2022 relative to the mean for the first 10 years of data (Fig. 21). This increase
 1074 is 5 times greater than the standard deviation ($0.21 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$) of annual absorbed solar energy in the
 1075 first 10 years of data and 4.5 times greater than the standard deviation ($0.23 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$) of CERES
 1076 data through December 2014. The increase of absorbed solar energy is notably larger than
 1077 estimated potential CERES instrument drift, which is $<0.085 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$ per decade.⁸⁸ Increased solar
 1078 energy absorption occurred despite 2015-2020 being the declining phase of the ~ 11 -year solar
 1079 irradiance cycle.¹⁸⁰ Nor can increased absorption be attributed to correlation of Earth's albedo
 1080 (and absorbed solar energy) with the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO): the PDO did shift to the
 1081 positive phase in 2014-2017, but it returned to the negative phase in 2017-2022.¹⁸¹

1082 Given the large increase of absorbed solar energy, cloud changes are likely the main cause.
 1083 Quantitative analysis¹⁸¹ of contributions to the 20-year trend of absorbed solar energy show that
 1084 clouds provide most of the change. Surface albedo decrease due to sea ice decline contributes to
 1085 the 20-year trend in the Northern Hemisphere, but that sea ice decline occurred especially in
 1086 2007, with minimum sea ice cover reached in 2012; over the past decade as global and
 1087 hemispheric albedos declined, sea ice had little trend.¹⁸² Potential causes of the cloud changes
 1088 include: 1) reduced aerosol forcing, 2) cloud feedbacks to global warming, 3) natural
 1089 variability.¹⁸³ Absorbed solar energy was $0.80 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$ greater in Jan2015-Feb2023 than in the first



1090
 1091 Fig. 22. Absorbed solar radiation for indicated regions relative to first 120 months of CERES
 1092 data. Southern Hemisphere 20-60°S is 89% ocean. North Atlantic is (20-60°N, 0-60°W) and
 1093 North Pacific is (20-60°N, 120-220°W). Data source: http://ceres.larc.nasa.gov/order_data.php

1094 decade of CERES data at latitudes 20-60°S (Fig. 22), a region of relatively little ship traffic. This
 1095 change is an order of magnitude larger than the estimate of potential detector degradation.⁸⁸
 1096 Climate models predict a reduction of cloud albedo in this region as a feedback effect driven by
 1097 global warming.¹⁸⁴ Continued monitoring of absorbed energy can confirm the reality of the
 1098 change, but without global monitoring of detailed physical properties of aerosols and clouds,¹⁵² it
 1099 will be difficult to apportion observed change among the candidate causes.

1100 The North Pacific and North Atlantic regions of heavy ship traffic are ripe for more detailed
 1101 study of cloud changes and their causes, although unforced cloud variability is large in such sub-
 1102 global regions. North Pacific and North Atlantic regions both have increased absorption of solar
 1103 radiation after 2015 (Fig. 22). The 2014-2017 maximum absorption in the North Pacific is likely
 1104 enhanced by reduced cloud cover during the positive PDO, but the more recent high absorption
 1105 is during the negative PDO phase. In the North Atlantic, the persistence of increased absorption
 1106 for the past several years exceeds prior variability, but longer records plus aerosol and cloud
 1107 microphysical data are needed for full interpretation.

1108 6. SUMMARY

1109 Earth's climate is characterized – ominously – by amplifying feedbacks and delayed response.
 1110 Feedbacks and delayed response have been recognized for at least 40 years, but they are difficult
 1111 to quantify. Feedbacks determine climate sensitivity to applied forcing. Delayed response makes
 1112 human-made climate forcing a threat to today's public and future generations because of the
 1113 practical difficulty of reversing the forcing once consequences become apparent to the public.
 1114 Thus, there is a premium on knowledge of climate sensitivity and response time, and the
 1115 implications must be delivered to the public as soon as possible. This objective confronts the
 1116 barrier of scientific reticence, which is illustrated by the following example: Richard Feynman
 1117 needed fellow physicists about their reticence to challenge authority,¹⁸⁵ using the famous oil
 1118 drop experiment in which Millikan derived the electron charge. Millikan's result was a bit off.
 1119 Later researchers only moved his result in small increments – uncertainties and choices in
 1120 experiments require judgment – and it thus required years for the community to achieve an
 1121 accurate value. Their reticence to contradict Millikan was an embarrassment to the physics

1122 community, but it caused no harm to society. Scientific reticence,¹⁸⁶ in part, may be a
1123 consequence of the scientific method, which is fueled by objective skepticism. Another factor
1124 that contributes to irrational reticence among rational scientists is “delay discounting,” a
1125 preference for immediate over delayed rewards.¹⁸⁷ The penalty for “crying wolf” is immediate,
1126 while the danger of being blamed for having “fiddled while Rome was burning” is distant. Also,
1127 one of us has noted¹⁸⁸ evidence that larding of papers and research proposals with caveats and
1128 uncertainties notably increases chances of obtaining research support. “Gradualism” that results
1129 from reticence seems to be comfortable and well-suited for maintaining long-term support.

1130 Reticence and gradualism reach a new level with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
1131 Change (IPCC). The prime example is IPCC’s history in evaluating climate sensitivity, the most
1132 basic measure of climate change, as summarized in our present paper. IPCC reports must be
1133 approved by UN-assembled governments, but that constraint should not dictate reticence and
1134 gradualism. Climate science clearly reveals the threat of being too late. “Being too late” refers
1135 not only to assessment of the climate threat, but also to technical advice on the implications of
1136 climate science for policy. Are not we as scientists complicit if we allow reticence and comfort
1137 to obfuscate our description of the climate situation and its implications? Does our training –
1138 years of graduate study and decades of experience – not make us the best-equipped to advise the
1139 public on the climate situation and its implications for policy? As professionals with the deepest
1140 understanding of planetary change and as guardians of young people and their future, do we not
1141 have an obligation, analogous to the code of ethics of medical professionals, to render to the
1142 public our full and unencumbered diagnosis and its implications? That is our aim here.

1143 **6.1. Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS)**

1144 The 1979 Charney study⁴ considered an idealized climate sensitivity in which ice sheets and non-
1145 CO₂ GHGs are fixed. The Charney group estimated that the equilibrium response to 2×CO₂, a
1146 forcing of 4 W/m², was 3°C, thus an ECS of 0.75°C per W/m², with one standard deviation
1147 uncertainty $\sigma = 0.375^\circ\text{C}$. Charney’s estimate stood as the canonical ECS for more than 40 years.
1148 The current IPCC report¹³ concludes that 3°C for 2×CO₂ is their best estimate for ECS.

1149 We compare recent glacial and interglacial climates to infer ECS with a precision not possible
1150 with climate models alone. Uncertainty about Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) temperature has
1151 been resolved independently with consistent results by Tierney *et al.*⁵³ and Seltzer *et al.*⁵⁶ The
1152 Tierney approach, using a collection of geochemical temperature indicators in a global analysis
1153 constrained by climate change patterns defined by a global climate model, is used by Osman *et*
1154 *al.*⁵⁴ to find peak LGM cooling $7.0 \pm 1^\circ\text{C}$ (2σ , 95% confidence) at 21-18 kyBP. We show that,
1155 accounting for polar amplification, these analyses are consistent with the $5.8 \pm 0.6^\circ\text{C}$ LGM
1156 cooling of land areas between 45°S and 35°N found by Seltzer *et al.* using the temperature-
1157 dependent solubility of dissolved noble gases in ancient groundwater. The forcing that
1158 maintained the 7°C LGM cooling was the sum of $2.25 \pm 0.45 \text{ W/m}^2$ (2σ) from GHGs and $3.5 \pm$
1159 1.0 W/m^2 (2σ) from the LGM surface albedo, thus $5.75 \pm 1.1 \text{ W/m}^2$ (2σ). ECS implied by the
1160 LGM is thus $1.22 \pm 0.29^\circ\text{C}$ (2σ) per W/m², which, at this final step, we round to $1.2 \pm 0.3^\circ\text{C}$ per
1161 W/m². For transparency, we have combined uncertainties via simple RMS (root-mean-square).
1162 ECS as low as 3°C for 2×CO₂ is excluded at the 3 σ level, i.e., with 99.7% confidence.

1163 More sophisticated mathematical analysis, which has merits but introduces opportunity for prior
1164 bias and obfuscation, is not essential; error assessment ultimately involves expert judgement.
1165 Instead, focus is needed on the largest source of error: LGM surface albedo change, which is
1166 uncertain because of the effect of cloud shielding on the efficacy of the forcing. As cloud
1167 modeling is advancing rapidly, the topic is ripe for collaboration of CMIP⁵⁸ (Coupled Model
1168 Intercomparison Project) with PMIP⁵⁹ (Paleoclimate Modelling Intercomparison Project).
1169 Simulations should include at the same time change of surface albedo and topography of ice
1170 sheets, vegetation change, and exposure of continental shelves due to lower sea level.

1171 Knowledge of climate sensitivity can be advanced further via analysis of the wide climate range
1172 in the Cenozoic era (Section 6.3). However, interpretation of data and models, and especially
1173 projections of climate change, depend on understanding of climate response time.


1174 **6.2. Climate response time**

1175 We expected climate response time – the time for climate to approach a new equilibrium after
1176 imposition of a forcing – to become faster as mixing of heat in ocean models improved.⁷⁹ That
1177 expectation was not met when we compared two generations of the GISS GCM. The GISS
1178 (2020) GCM is demonstrably improved^{34,35} in its ocean simulation over the GISS (2014) GCM
1179 as a result of higher vertical and horizontal resolution, more realistic parameterization of sub-grid
1180 scale motions, and correction of errors in the ocean computer program.³⁴ Yet the time required
1181 for the model to achieve 63% of its equilibrium response remains about 100 years. There are two
1182 reasons for this, one that is obvious and one that is more interesting and informative.

1183 The surface in the newer model warms as fast as in the older model, but it must achieve greater
1184 warming to reach 63% of equilibrium because its ECS is higher, which is the first reason that the
1185 response time remains long. The other reason is that Earth's energy imbalance (EEI) in the newer
1186 model decreases rapidly. EEI defines the rate that heat is pumped into the ocean, so a smaller
1187 EEI implies a longer time for the ocean to reach its new equilibrium temperature. Quick drop of
1188 EEI – in the first year after introduction of the forcing – implies existence of ultrafast feedback in
1189 the GISS (2020) model. For want of an alternative with such a large effect on Earth's energy
1190 budget, we infer a rapid cloud feedback and we suggest (Section 3.3) a set of brief GCM runs
1191 that could define cloud changes and other diagnostic quantities to an arbitrary accuracy.

1192 The Charney report⁴ recognized that clouds were a main cause of a wide range in ECS estimates.
1193 Today, clouds still cast uncertainty on climate predictions. Several CMIP6³⁶ GCMs have ECS of
1194 ~ 4-6°C for 2×CO₂^{189,190} with the high sensitivity caused by cloud feedbacks.⁹¹ As cloud
1195 modeling progresses, it will aid understanding if climate models report their 2×CO₂ response
1196 functions for both temperature and EEI (Earth's energy imbalance).

1197 Fast EEI response – faster than global temperature response – has a practical effect: observed
1198 EEI understates the reduction of climate forcing required to stabilize climate. Although the
1199 magnitude of this effect is uncertain (see Supporting Material SM6), it makes the task of
1200 restoring a hospitable climate and saving coastal cities more challenging. On the other hand, long
1201 climate response time implies the potential for educated policies to affect the climate outcome
1202 before the most undesirable consequences occur.




1203
 1204 Fig. 23. (a) Cenozoic surface temperature estimated from deep ocean oxygen isotope data of
 1205 Westerhold *et al.*⁹⁸ and (b) implied CO₂ history for ECS = 1.2°C per W/m² (black curve); red and
 1206 green curves for ECS = 1.0 and 1.4°C per W/m² are 1 My smoothed.

1207 The time required for climate to reach a new equilibrium is relevant to policy (Section 6.6), but
 1208 there is another response time of practical importance. With climate in a state of disequilibrium,
 1209 how much time do we have before we pass the point of no return, the point where major climate
 1210 impacts are locked in, beyond our ability to control? That’s a complex matter; it requires
 1211 understanding of “slow” feedbacks, especially ice sheets. It also depends on how far climate is
 1212 out of equilibrium. Thus, we first consider the full Earth system sensitivity.

1213 6.3. Earth system sensitivity (ESS)

1214 The Cenozoic era – the past 66 million years – provides an opportunity to study Earth system
 1215 sensitivity via a consistent analysis for climate ranging from hothouse conditions with Earth
 1216 15°C warmer and sea level 60 m higher than preindustrial climate to glacial conditions with
 1217 Earth 7°C cooler and sea level 120 m lower than preindustrial. Atmospheric CO₂ amount in the
 1218 past 800,000 years, known from bubbles of air trapped in the Antarctic ice sheet, confirms
 1219 expectation that CO₂ is the main control knob⁹⁴ on global temperature (Fig. 2). We can assume
 1220 this control existed at earlier times when CO₂ amount was larger as a result of CO₂ emissions
 1221 caused by plate tectonics (continental drift). The two-step¹⁰¹ that the Indian plate executed as it
 1222 moved through the Tethys (now Indian) ocean left an indelible signature in atmospheric CO₂ and
 1223 global temperature. CO₂ emissions from subduction of ocean crust were greatest when the Indian
 1224 plate was moving fastest (inset, Fig. 6) and peaked at its hard collision with the Eurasian plate at
 1225 50 MyBP. Diminishing metamorphic CO₂ emissions continue as the Indian plate is subducted
 1226 beneath the Eurasian plate, pushing up the Himalayan Mountains, but carbon drawdown from
 1227 weathering and burial of organic carbon exceeds emissions. Motion of the Indian Plate thus
 1228 dominates the broad sweep of Cenozoic CO₂, but igneous provinces play a role. The North
 1229 Atlantic Igneous Province (caused by a rift in the sea floor as Greenland pulled away from
 1230 Europe) that triggered the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM) event about 56 MyBP
 1231 and the Columbia River Flood Basalt about 15 MyBP (Fig. 6) are most notable.

1232 We infer the Cenozoic history of sea surface temperature (SST) at sites of deepwater formation
 1233 from the oxygen isotope $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ in shells of deep-ocean-dwelling foraminifera preserved in ocean
 1234 sediments.^{47,98} The high latitude SST change – including a correction term as SST approaches
 1235 the freezing point – provides an accurate estimate of global surface temperature change. This
 1236 Cenozoic temperature history and climate sensitivity inferred from the LGM cooling define the
 1237 Cenozoic CO₂ history. We suggest that this whole-Cenozoic approach defines the CO₂ history
 1238 (Fig. 23b) more accurately than CO₂ proxy measurements. We find CO₂ about 325 ppm in the
 1239 early Pliocene and 450 ppm at transition to glaciated Antarctica. Global climate models (GCMs)




1240 Fig. 24. Forcing required to yield Cenozoic temperature for today's solar irradiance, compared
 1241 with human-made GHG forcing in 2022.
 1242

1243 that isolate on the Pliocene tend to use CO₂ levels of order 400 ppm in attempts to match actual
 1244 Pliocene warmth and ice sheet models use CO₂ of order 700 ppm or greater to achieve ice sheet
 1245 disintegration on Antarctica, which suggests that the models are not realistically capturing
 1246 amplifying feedback processes (see Section 4.3).

1247 The Cenozoic provides a perspective on present greenhouse gas (GHG) levels. The dashed line
 1248 in Fig. 24 marks the “we are here” level of GHG climate forcing, which is more than half of the
 1249 forcing that maintained EECO global temperature of +15°C relative to the Holocene. Today's
 1250 GHG forcing of 4.6 W/m² is relative to mid-Holocene CO₂ of 260 ppm; we present evidence in
 1251 Section 4.3 that 260 ppm is the natural Holocene CO₂ level. GHG forcing today already is well
 1252 above the level needed to deglaciate Antarctica, if the forcing is left in place long enough. We
 1253 are not predicting deglaciation of Antarctica on a time scale that today's people would care about
 1254 – rather we are drawing attention to how far today's climate is out of equilibrium with today's
 1255 GHG level. The extent that the climate is out of equilibrium with atmospheric composition is one
 1256 measure of how strongly humanity is pushing the climate system. Hope of approximately
 1257 stabilizing climate requires removing the disequilibrium by reducing human-made climate
 1258 forcing. The danger is that – if deglaciation is allowed to get well underway – it will become
 1259 difficult if not impossible to prevent large sea level rise.

1260 GHGs are not the only large human-made climate forcing. Understanding of ongoing climate
 1261 change requires that we also include the effect of aerosols (fine airborne particles).

1262




1263
 1264 Fig. 25. Global temperature relative to 1880-1920. Edges of the predicted post-2010 accelerated
 1265 warming rate (see text) are 0.36 and 0.27°C per decade.

1266 **6.4. Aerosols**

1267 Aerosol climate forcing is larger than the IPCC AR6 estimate and has probably been significant
 1268 for millennia. We know of no other persuasive explanation for the absence of global warming in
 1269 the last half of the Holocene (Fig. 14) as GHG forcing increased 0.5 W/m^2 (Fig. 15). Climate
 1270 models that do not incorporate a growing negative aerosol forcing yield significant warming in
 1271 that period,¹⁹¹ a warming that, in fact, did not occur. Negative aerosol forcing, increasing as
 1272 civilization developed and population grew, is expected. As humans burned fuels at a growing
 1273 rate – wood and other biomass for millennia and fossil fuels in the industrial era – aerosols as
 1274 well as GHGs were an abundant, growing, biproduct. The aerosol source from wood-burning has
 1275 continued in modern times.¹⁹² GHGs are long-lived and accumulate, so their forcing dominates
 1276 eventually, unless aerosol emissions grow higher and higher – the Faustian bargain.¹⁰⁶

1277 We estimate peak (negative) aerosol forcing – in the first decade of this century – of at least 1.5-
 1278 2 W/m^2 , but aerosol amount now seems to be in decline. We estimate that GHG plus aerosol
 1279 forcing during 1970-2010 grew $+0.3 \text{ W/m}^2$ per decade ($+0.45$ from GHG, -0.15 from aerosols),
 1280 which produced warming of 0.18°C per decade. With current policies, we expect climate forcing
 1281 for a few decades post-2010 to increase $0.5\text{-}0.6 \text{ W/m}^2$ per decade and produce global warming of
 1282 at least $+0.27^\circ\text{C}$ per decade. In that case, global warming will reach 1.5°C by the end of the
 1283 2020s and 2°C before 2050 (Fig. 25). Such acceleration is highly dangerous in a climate system
 1284 that is already far out of equilibrium and dominated by multiple amplifying feedbacks.

1285 In the absence of global monitoring of aerosol microphysics, the sharp change of ship emissions
 1286 in 2015 and especially in 2020 (Section 5.4) may provide an indirect measure of aerosol effects.
 1287 Diamond¹⁹³ finds evidence of a cloud brightness decrease amounting to a forcing of order 1
 1288 W/m^2 in a shipping corridor. Satellite measurement of absorbed solar radiation (Fig. 22) that
 1289 include the effect of cloud cover change suggest a somewhat larger effect. However, the single
 1290 best sentinel for climate, our best measure of where global temperature is headed in the next
 1291 decade, is Earth's energy imbalance.



1292 Fig. 26. 12-month running-mean of Earth's energy imbalance from CERES satellite data⁸⁸
 1293 normalized to 0.71 W/m² mean for July 2005 – June 2015 (light blue bar) from in situ data.⁸⁷
 1294

1295 **6.5. Earth's energy imbalance**

1296 Earth's energy imbalance (EEI) is the net gain (or loss) of energy by the planet, the difference
 1297 between absorbed solar energy and emitted thermal (heat) radiation. As long as EEI is positive,
 1298 Earth will continue to get hotter. EEI is hard to measure, a small difference between two large
 1299 quantities (Earth absorbs and emits about 240 W/m² averaged over the entire planetary surface),
 1300 but change of EEI can be well-measured from space.⁸⁸ Absolute calibration is from the change of
 1301 heat in the heat reservoirs, mainly the global ocean, over a period of at least a decade, as required
 1302 to reduce error due to the finite number of places that the ocean is sampled.⁸⁷ EEI varies year-to-
 1303 year (Fig. 26), largely because global cloud amount varies with weather and ocean dynamics, but
 1304 averaged over several years EEI helps inform us about what is needed to stabilize climate.

1305 The data suggest that EEI has doubled since the first decade of this century (Fig. 26). This
 1306 increase is one basis for our prediction of post-2010 acceleration of the global warming rate. The
 1307 EEI increase may be partly due to restrictions on maritime aerosol precursor emissions imposed
 1308 in 2015 and 2020 (Section 5.4), but the growth rate of GHG climate forcing also increased in
 1309 2015 and since has remained at the higher level (Section 6.6).

1310 The reduction of climate forcing required to reduce EEI to zero is greater than EEI. The added
 1311 burden is a result of ultrafast cloud feedback (Section 3.3). Cloud feedbacks are only beginning
 1312 to be simulated well, but climate sensitivity near 1.2°C per W/m² implies that the net cloud
 1313 feedback is large, with clouds accounting for as much as half of equilibrium climate sensitivity.

1314 Continuation of precise monitoring of EEI is essential as a sentinel for future climate change and
 1315 for the purpose of assessing efforts to stabilize climate and avoid undesirable consequences.
 1316 Global satellite monitoring of geographical and temporal changes of the imbalance and ocean in
 1317 situ monitoring (especially in polar regions of rapid change) are both needed for the sake of
 1318 understanding ongoing climate change.


1319 **6.6. Global warming and sea level rise in the pipeline**

1320 Cenozoic CO₂ and climate histories reveal where climate is headed, if present human-made
 1321 climate forcings remain in place. GHG climate forcing is now 4.6 W/m² relative to the mid-
 1322 Holocene (7kyBP) or 4.1 W/m² relative to 1750. We argue that 4.6 W/m² is the human-made

1323 forcing, but there is little point to debate whether it should be 4.6 W/m^2 or 4.1 W/m^2 because the
1324 GHG forcing is increasing 0.5 W/m^2 per decade (Section 6.7). One merit of consistent analysis
1325 for the full Cenozoic era is revelation that the human-made climate forcing exceeds the forcing at
1326 transition from a largely ice-free planet to glaciated Antarctica, even with inclusion of a large,
1327 negative, aerosol climate forcing. Equilibrium global warming for today's GHG level is 10°C for
1328 our central estimate $\text{ECS} = 1.2^\circ\text{C} \pm 0.3^\circ\text{C}$ per W/m^2 , including amplifications from disappearing
1329 ice sheets and non- CO_2 GHGs (Sec. 4.4). Aerosols reduce equilibrium warming to about 8°C .
1330 Equilibrium sea level change is $+60 \text{ m}$ (about 200 feet).

1331 Discussions¹⁹⁴ between the first author (JEH) and field glaciologists¹⁹⁵ 20 years ago revealed a
1332 frustration of the glaciologists with the conservative tone of IPCC's assessment of ice sheets and
1333 sea level rise. One of the glaciologists said – regarding a photo¹⁹⁶ of a moulin (a vertical shaft
1334 that carries meltwater to the base of the ice sheet) on Greenland – “the whole ice sheet is going
1335 down that damned hole!” Their concern was based on observed ice sheet changes and
1336 paleoclimate evidence of sea level rise by several meters in a century, which suggest that ice
1337 sheet collapse is an exponential process. Thus, as an alternative to the IPCC approach that relies
1338 on ice sheet models coupled to atmosphere-ocean GCMs (global climate models), a study was
1339 made that avoided use of an ice sheet model, as described in the paper *Ice Melt*.¹⁴ In the GCM
1340 simulation, a growing amount of freshwater was added to the ocean surface mixed layer around
1341 Greenland and Antarctica, with the flux in the early 21st century based on estimates from *in situ*
1342 glaciological studies¹⁹⁷ and satellite observations of sea level trends near Antarctica.¹⁹⁸ Doubling
1343 times of 10 and 20 years were used for the growth of freshwater flux. One merit of the GCM
1344 used in *Ice Melt* was its reduced, more realistic, small-scale ocean mixing, with a result that
1345 Antarctic Bottom Water in the model was formed close to the Antarctic coast¹⁴ as it is in the real
1346 world. Continued growth of GHG emissions and meltwater led to shutdown of the North Atlantic
1347 and Southern Ocean overturning circulations, amplified warming at the foot of the ice shelves
1348 that buttress the ice sheets, and other feedbacks consistent with “nonlinearly growing sea level
1349 rise, reaching several meters over a time scale of 50-150 years.”¹⁴ This paper exposed urgency to
1350 understand the dynamical change and the climate chaos that would occur with ice sheet collapse,
1351 a situation that may have occurred during the Eemian period when it was about as warm as
1352 today, as discussed in the *Ice Melt* paper. That period has potential to help us understand how
1353 close we are to a point of no return and sea level rise of several meters.

1354 *Ice Melt* was blackballed from IPCC's AR6 report, which is a form of censorship,¹⁵ as alternative
1355 views normally are acknowledged in science. Science grants ultimate authority to nature. In the
1356 opinion of JEH, IPCC is comfortable with gradualism and does not want its authority challenged.
1357 Caution has merits, but with a climate system characterized by a delayed response and
1358 amplifying feedbacks, excessive reticence is a danger, especially for young people. Concern
1359 about locking in nonlinearly growing sea level rise is amplified in our present paper by the
1360 revelation that the equilibrium response to current atmospheric composition is a nearly ice-free
1361 Antarctica. Portions of the ice sheets well above sea level may be recalcitrant to rapid change,
1362 but enough ice is in contact with the ocean to provide of the order of 25 m (80 feet) of sea level
1363 rise. The implication is that if we allow a few meters of sea level rise, that may lock in a much
1364 larger sea level rise. Happily, we will suggest that it is still feasible to stabilize sea level.




1365
1366 Fig. 27. Global energy consumption and CO₂ emissions (Hefner et al.¹⁹⁹ and BP²⁰⁰).

1367 **6.7. Policy implications**

1368 This section is the first author’s perspective based on more than 20 years of experience on policy
1369 issues beginning with workshops that he organized at the East-West Center in Hawaii, meetings
1370 and workshops with energy experts, and trips to more than a dozen nations for consultations with
1371 government officials, energy experts, and environmentalists.


1372 Global warming “in the pipeline” is not “committed warming” that necessarily will occur.
1373 Warming in the pipeline⁷⁸ is the difference between equilibrium temperature for current
1374 atmospheric composition and the current temperature, consistent with Charney’s study,⁴ but it
1375 depends on whether “slow” feedbacks are fixed (ECS) or allowed to vary (ESS). Committed
1376 warming is complex; it depends on assumed future emissions and other potential actions to affect
1377 Earth’s energy balance. Committed warming depends on aerosol change as well as GHG change.
1378 Scenarios confined to plausible GHG emission reductions alone are unlikely to keep global
1379 warming below 2°C, as shown below. The next several years are a crucial time to quantify the
1380 threat of passing the point of no return that locks in sea level rise of many meters and to assess
1381 potential ways to avoid that outcome. Assessment should develop the full scientific toolbox
1382 including better understanding of climate change during the Eemian period that was moderately
1383 warmer than the Holocene, the effects of natural “experiments” such as the Pinatubo volcanic
1384 eruption, and analysis of the effects of ongoing changes of atmospheric gases and aerosols.

1385 The world’s present energy and climate path has good reason. Fossil fuels powered the industrial
1386 revolution and raised living standards in much of the world. Fossil fuels still provide most of the
1387 world’s energy (Fig. 27a) and produce most CO₂ emissions (Fig. 27b). Fossil fuel reserves and
1388 recoverable resources could provide most of the world’s energy for the rest of this century.²⁰¹
1389 Much of the world is still in early or middle stages of economic development. Energy is needed
1390 and fossil fuels are a convenient, affordable source of energy. One gallon (3.6 liters) of gasoline
1391 (petrol) provides the work equivalent of more than 400 hours labor by a healthy adult. These
1392 benefits are the basic reason for continued emissions.




1393
 1394 Fig. 28. Annual growth of climate forcing by GHGs⁴¹ including part of O₃ forcing not included
 1395 in CH₄ forcing (Supp. Material). MPTG and OTG are Montreal Protocol and Other Trace Gases.

1396 The United Nations employs targets for a global warming limit and for emission reductions as a
 1397 tool to cajole progress in limiting climate change. IPCC has defined scenarios that help us judge
 1398 progress toward meeting such targets. Among the RCP scenarios (Fig. 28) in the IPCC AR5
 1399 report, the RCP2.6 scenario defines rapid downward trend of greenhouse gas climate forcings
 1400 needed to prevent global warming from exceeding 2°C relative to preindustrial climate. The gap
 1401 between that scenario and reality continues to grow. In principle, the 0.03 W/m² gap in 2022
 1402 could be closed by extraction of CO₂ from the air. However, the required negative emissions
 1403 (CO₂ extracted from the air and placed in permanent storage) must be larger than the desired
 1404 atmospheric CO₂ reduction by a factor of about 1.7.⁶⁸ Thus, the required CO₂ extraction is 2.1
 1405 ppm, which is 7.6 GtC. Based on a pilot carbon capture plant built in Canada, Keith²⁰² estimates
 1406 an extraction cost of \$450-920 per tC, as clarified elsewhere.²⁰³ Keith's cost range yields an
 1407 extraction cost of \$3.4-7.0 trillion. This is for excess emissions in 2022 only; it is an annual cost.
 1408 Given the difficulty the UN faced in raising \$0.1 trillion for climate purposes and the growing
 1409 annual emissions gap (Fig. 28), this example shows both the need to reduce emissions as rapidly
 1410 as practical and the fact that carbon capture cannot be viewed as the solution, although it may
 1411 play a role in a portfolio of policies, if its cost is driven down.




1412
 1413 Fig. 29. Fossil fuel CO₂ emissions from mature and emerging economies. China is counted as an
 1414 emerging economy. Data sources: Heffner *et al.*¹⁹⁹ for 1751-2017 and BP²⁰⁰ for 2018-2020.



1415
 1416 Fig. 30. Fossil fuel CO₂ emissions by nation or region as a fraction of global emissions. Data
 1417 sources: Heffner *et al.*¹⁹⁹ for 1751-2017 and BP²⁰⁰ for 2018-2020.

1418 Climate policy under the Framework Convention demonstrably fails to curb and reverse growth
 1419 of GHGs (Figs. 27-29). [The Covid pandemic dented emissions, but 2022 global emissions are at
 1420 a record high level.] This is the “tragedy of the commons”: as long as fossil fuel pollution can be
 1421 dumped in the air free of charge, agreements such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol²⁰⁴ and 2015 Paris
 1422 Agreement have little effect on global emissions. Energy is needed to raise living standards and
 1423 fossil fuels are still the most convenient, affordable source of that energy. Thus, growth of
 1424 emissions is occurring in emerging economies (Figs. 29 and 30a), while mature economies are
 1425 still the larger source of the cumulative emissions (Fig. 30b) that drive climate change.^{205,206}
 1426 Thus, exhortations at UN meetings, imploring reduced emissions, have limited global effect.

1427 Meanwhile, climate science has exposed a crisis that the world is loath to appreciate. IPCC, the
 1428 scientific body advising the world on climate, does not bluntly inform the world that the present
 1429 “wishful thinking” geopolitical approach will be disastrous for today’s young people and their
 1430 children. Political leaders profess ambitions for dubious net-zero emissions while fossil fuel
 1431 extraction expands. The only IPCC scenarios that phase down human-made climate change
 1432 amount to “a miracle will occur.” The one IPCC scenario that moves rapidly to negative global
 1433 emissions has biomass-burning powerplants that capture and sequester CO₂, a nature-ravaging
 1434 proposition without scientific and engineering credibility and without a realistic chance of being
 1435 deployed at scale and on time to address the climate threat.



1436
1437 Fig. 31. Cumulative per capita national fossil fuel emissions.²⁰⁷

1438 A new plan is essential. The plan must cool the planet to preserve our coastlines. Even today’s
1439 temperature would cause eventual multimeter sea level rise, and a majority of the world’s large
1440 and historic cities are on coastlines. Cooling will also address other major problems caused by
1441 global warming. We should aim to return to a climate close to that in which civilization
1442 developed, in which the nature that we know and love thrived. As far as is known, it is still
1443 feasible to do that without passing through an irreversible disaster such as many-meter sea level
1444 rise. Given the situation that we have allowed to develop, three actions are now essential.

1445 First, a rising global price on GHG emissions must underly energy and climate policies, with
1446 enforcement by border duties on products from countries that do not have an internal carbon fee
1447 or tax. Public buy-in and maximum effectiveness require that the collected funds be distributed
1448 to the public, an approach that helps address global wealth disparities. Economists in the U.S.
1449 overwhelmingly support carbon fee-and-dividend²⁰⁸; college and high school students, who have
1450 much at stake, join in advocacy.²⁰⁹ Science rationale for a rising carbon price with a level playing
1451 field for energy efficiency, renewable energies, nuclear power, and all innovations has long been
1452 understood, but not achieved. Instead, fossil fuels and renewable energy are heavily subsidized,
1453 including use of “renewable portfolio standards” that let utilities pass added costs to consumers.
1454 Thus, nuclear energy has been disadvantaged and excluded as a “clean development mechanism”
1455 under the Kyoto Protocol, based in part on myths about damage caused by nuclear energy that
1456 are not supported by scientific facts.²¹⁰ A rising carbon price is not a panacea – many other
1457 actions are needed – but it is the *sine qua non*. Without it, fossil fuels will continue to be used
1458 extensively and global warming and climate impacts will continue to grow.

1459 Second, effective global cooperation is needed to achieve reduction of GHG climate forcing.
1460 High income countries, mainly in the West, are responsible for most of the cumulative fossil fuel
1461 CO₂ emissions (Fig. 30b and Fig. 31), which are the main drive for global warming,^{205,206} even
1462 though the West is a small fraction of global population. De facto cooperation between the West
1463 and China drove down the price of renewable energy, but more cooperation is needed to develop
1464 emission-free technologies for the rest of the world, which will be the source of most future
1465 GHG emissions (Fig. 29a). A crucial need is carbon-free electricity, the essential, growing,
1466 clean-energy carrier. In the West, except for limited locations with large hydropower, the main
1467 source of clean electricity has been nuclear power, and nations with emerging economies are
1468 eager to have modern nuclear power because of its small environmental footprint. Thus, China-
1469 U.S. cooperation in development of modern nuclear power was proposed, but then stymied by

1470 U.S. prohibition of technology transfer.²¹¹ Competition is normal, but it can be managed if there
1471 is a will, reaping benefits of cooperation over confrontation.²¹² Of late, priority has been given
1472 instead to economic and military hegemony, despite recognition of the climate threat, and
1473 without consultation with young people or seeming consideration of their aspirations. We must
1474 not foreclose the possibility of return to a more ecumenical perspective of our shared future.
1475 Scientists can improve global prospects by maintaining and expanding international cooperation.
1476 Awareness of the gathering climate storm will grow this decade, so we must increase scientific
1477 understanding worldwide as needed for climate restoration.

1478 Third, we must take actions to reduce and reverse Earth's energy imbalance to keep global
1479 climate within a habitable range. Highest priority must be on phasing down emissions, but, due
1480 to past failure to reduce GHG emissions, it is now implausible to achieve the needed timely
1481 change of Earth's energy balance solely via GHG emission reductions. Phasedown of emissions
1482 cannot restore Earth's energy balance within less than several decades, which is too slow to
1483 prevent grievous escalation of climate impacts and probably too slow to avoid locking in loss of
1484 the West Antarctic ice sheet and sea level rise of several meters. Given that several years are
1485 needed to forge a political approach for climate restoration, as discussed below, intense
1486 investigation of potential actions should proceed now. This will not deter action on mitigation of
1487 emissions; on the contrary, it will spur such action and allow search for "a miracle." A promising
1488 – and probably necessary – approach to overcome humanity's harmful geo-transformation of
1489 Earth is temporary solar radiation management (SRM). Risks of such intervention must be
1490 defined, as well as risks of no intervention; thus, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences
1491 recommends research on SRM.²¹³ An example of SRM is injection of atmospheric aerosols at
1492 high southern latitudes, which global simulations suggest would cool the Southern Ocean at
1493 depth and limit melting of Antarctic ice shelves.^{15,214} The most innocuous aerosols may be fine
1494 salty droplets extracted from the ocean and sprayed into the air by autonomous sailboats.²¹⁵ This
1495 approach has been discussed for potential use on a global scale,²¹⁶ but even use limited to
1496 Southern Hemisphere high latitudes requires research and forethought to avoid unintended
1497 adverse effects.²¹⁷ The present decade is probably our last chance to develop the knowledge,
1498 technical capability, and political will for the actions needed to save global coastal regions from
1499 long-term inundation.


1500 These three basic actions are feasible, but they are not happening. Did we scientists inform the
1501 public and policymakers well? Opportunities for progress often occur in conjunction with crises.
1502 Before describing today's crisis and opportunity, we should review prior cases. In 1992, it was
1503 the climate crisis per se, with the Framework Convention on Climate Change. William Clinton
1504 was elected President of the United States with his party in control of both houses of Congress.
1505 Clinton's most climate-consequential action was in his first State-of-the-Union address as he
1506 declared "We are eliminating programs that are no longer needed, such as nuclear power
1507 research and development." For 30 years since, renewable energy received unlimited subsidy via
1508 renewable portfolio standards, and renewable energies are now ready for prime time. However,
1509 nuclear power, the potential carbon-free complement to renewables for baseload electricity, was
1510 denied such support, so today most electricity worldwide is from fossil fuels. At the next global
1511 crisis, the financial crisis of 2008, Barack Obama was elected President of the United States,
1512 with his party in control of both houses of Congress. Obama had pledged to address "a planet in
1513 peril" in his campaign, but with Congress poised – indeed, forced – to pass economic legislation,
1514 Obama did not attempt to include the most fundamental needed action: a price on carbon.

1515 Today, the world faces a crisis – extreme political polarization, especially in the United States –
1516 that threatens effective governance. Yet it is a great time to be a young person, because the crisis
1517 offers the opportunity to help shape the future – of the nation and the planet. The problem and
1518 solution are not hard to understand. Following World War II, the United States exercised
1519 leadership in the formation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the Marshall Plan, and the
1520 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Centuries-long progress toward equal rights continued,
1521 albeit slowly. The “American dream” of economic opportunity was real, as most people willing
1522 to work hard could afford college. Immigration policy welcomed the brightest; NASA in the
1523 1960s invited scientists from European countries, Japan, China, India, Canada – those wanting to
1524 stay found immigration to be straightforward. But the power of special interests in Washington
1525 grew, government became insular and inefficient, and Congress refused to police itself as their
1526 first priority became reelection and maintenance of elite status, supported by special interests.
1527 Thousands of pages of giveaways to special interests lard every funding bill, including the
1528 climate bill titled “Inflation Reduction Act” – Orwellian double-speak – as every dollar is
1529 borrowed from young people via deficit spending. The public is fed up with the Washington
1530 swamp but hamstrung by rigid two-party elections focused on a polarized cultural war, while the
1531 elite is satisfied with a system that allows them to accumulate wealth without paying taxes.

1532 A political party that takes no money from special interests is needed to address political
1533 polarization, which is essential if the West is to be capable of helping preserve the planet and a
1534 bright future for coming generations. Young people showed their ability to drive an election –
1535 via their support of Obama and later Bernie Sanders – without any funding from special interests.
1536 Groundwork is being laid to allow third party candidates in 2026 and 2028 elections in the U.S.
1537 Ranked voting is being advocated in every state – to avoid the “spoiler” effect of a third party. It
1538 is asking a lot to expect young people to grasp the situation that they have been handed – but a
1539 lot is at stake for them. As they realize that they are being handed a planet in decline, the first
1540 reaction may be to stamp their feet and demand that governments do better, but the effect of that
1541 is limited. Nor is it sufficient to parrot the big environmental organizations, which have become
1542 part of the problem, as they are largely supported by the fossil fuel industry and wealthy donors
1543 who are comfortable with the status quo. Instead, young people have the opportunity to provide
1544 the drive for a revolution that restores the ideals of democracy while developing the technical
1545 knowledge that is needed to navigate the stormy sea that their world is setting out upon.

1546 Required political and scientific timings are consistent. Several years are needed to alter the
1547 political system such that the will of the majority has an opportunity to be realized. Several years
1548 of continued climate change will elevate the priority of climate change and confirm the
1549 inadequacy of the present policy approach. Several years will permit improved understanding of
1550 the climate science and thus help to assess risks and benefits of alternative actions.

1551 **SUPPORTING MATERIAL**



1552
 1553 Fig. S1. Greenhouse gas (GHG) climate forcings for the five terms in Equation (4). The forcings
 1554 incorporate efficacies, including effects of a 3-dimensional atmosphere and seasonal change,
 1555 which alter the adjusted forcings calculated with a 1-dimensional radiative-convective model.

1556 **SM1. GHG forcing formulae and comparison with IPCC forcings**


1557 Formulae²¹⁸ (Table 1) for adjusted forcing, F_a , were numerical fits to 1-D calculations with the
 1558 GISS GCM radiation code using the correlated k-distribution method.³⁸ Gas absorption data
 1559 were from high spectral resolution laboratory data.³⁹ These F_a were converted to F_e via GCM
 1560 calculations that include 3-D effects, as summarized in Eq. (4), where the coefficients are from
 1561 Table 1 of *Efficacy*.³² The factor 1.45 for CH_4 includes the effect of CH_4 change on stratospheric
 1562 H_2O and tropospheric O_3 . We assume that CH_4 is responsible for 45% of the O_3 change.⁴⁰ The
 1563 remaining 55% of the O_3 forcing is obtained by multiplying the IPCC AR6 O_3 forcing (0.47
 1564 W/m^2 in 2019) by 0.55 and by 0.82, where the latter factor is the efficacy that converts F_a to F_e .
 1565 The non- CH_4 portion of the O_3 forcing is thus 0.21 W/m^2 in 2019. The time-dependence of this
 1566 portion of the O_3 forcing is from Table AIII.3 in IPCC AR6. MPTGs and OTGs are Montreal
 1567 Protocol Trace Gases and Other Trace Gases.⁴¹ An updated list of these gases and a table of
 1568 their annual forcings since 1992 are [available](#) as are [earlier data](#).⁴²

Table 1. Greenhouse gas radiative forcings

Gas	Radiative forcing
CO_2	$F = f(c) - f(c_o)$, where $f(c) = 4.996 \ln(c + 0.0005c^2)$
CH_4	$F = 0.0406(\sqrt{m} - \sqrt{m_o}) - [g(m, n_o) - g(m_o, n_o)]$
N_2O	$F = 0.136(\sqrt{n} - \sqrt{n_o}) - [g(m_o, n) - g(m_o, n_o)]$, where $g(m, n) = 0.5 \ln[1 + 2 \times 10^{-5}(mn)^{0.75}]$
CFC-11	$F = 0.264(x - x_o)$
CFC-12	$F = 0.323(y - y_o)$

c , CO_2 (ppm); m , CH_4 (ppb); n , N_2O (ppb); x/y , CFC-11/12 (ppb).


1569



1570
1571 Fig. S2. Test of accuracy of 2-term approximation for forcing by the three gases.

1572 **SM2. Approximation for N₂O forcing**


1573 CO₂ and CH₄ are well-preserved in ice cores. However, the N₂O record is corrupted in some time
1574 intervals by chemical reactions with dust particles in the ice core. For such intervals we
1575 approximate the N₂O forcing by increasing the sum of CO₂ and CH₄ forcings by 12%, i.e., we
1576 approximate the forcing for all three gases as 1.12×[F(CO₂) + F(CH₄)]. The accuracy of this
1577 approximation is checked in Fig. S2 via computations for the past 132 ky, when data are
1578 available for all three gases from the multi-core composite of Schilt et al.⁵¹



1579
1580 Fig. S3. Climate forcings provided in current IPCC report¹³ for GHGs plus aerosols and for all
1581 human-made forcings, i.e., excluding only volcano and solar forcings.

1582 **SM3. Comparison of GHG + Aerosol forcing with All Human-Made forcing**

1583 IPCC all human-made forcings include land-use effects and contrails, which have large relative
1584 uncertainties. The forcings in Fig. S3 are those provided by IPCC (cf. Annex III of the current
1585 IPCC physical sciences report).¹³




1586
1587 Fig. S4. Surface temperature response to 2×CO₂ of GISS (2020) GCM (Sections 3).

1588 **SM4. Land warming vs. global warming: effect of polar amplification**

1589 Land areas usually have a larger response to a forcing as shown by the response in Fig. S4 of the
 1590 GISS (2020) GCM to 2×CO₂ forcing. The warming over land at latitudes 45°S to 35°N (2.62°C)
 1591 after 150 years (mean for years 101-200 is 18% larger than the global mean warming. However,
 1592 the equilibrium warming (3.52°C) of this low-latitude land is only 2% larger than global
 1593 warming (3.44°C), as a result of the polar amplification of global warming. This result indicates
 1594 that – for a case in which ice sheets are held fixed – the measurement of Seltzer *et al.*⁵⁶ of LGM
 1595 cooling of 5.8°C for land area 45°S-35°N is representative of the equilibrium temperature change
 1596 for a planet in which the ice sheets are held fixed, as polar amplification of temperature change
 1597 offsets the fact that land response to a forcing exceeds ocean response. Moreover, in the LGM
 1598 the real world, ice sheets were not fixed. Polar amplification of temperature change in the LGM,
 1599 compared to the Holocene, was substantially increased by the growth of ice sheets, as shown in
 1600 Fig. 9 of Hansen *et al.* (1984).⁷ Thus, the LGM global cooling would be substantially greater
 1601 than the 5.8°C cooling of land area 45°S-35°N.

1602 **SM5. CH₄ and N₂O forcings as percent of CO₂ forcing in Antarctic ice cores.**

1603 Based on the CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O amounts in the multi-ice core GHG tabulation of Schilt *et al.*⁵¹
 1604 for the past 140 ky, we calculated the ratio of CH₄ and N₂O forcings to the CO₂ forcing (Fig. S5).
 1605 The data cover a range of global temperature from the LGM minimum to the Eemian maximum.



1606 Fig. S5. CH₄ and N₂O radiative forcings as a percent of the CO₂ forcing in past 140 ky.
1607

1608 **SM6. Global warming in the pipeline: Green’s function calculations**

1609 Global warming in the pipeline (ΔT_{pl}) after a CO₂ doubling is the portion of the equilibrium
1610 response (T_{eq}) that remains to occur at time t , i.e., $\Delta T_{pl} = T_{eq} - T(t)$. If EEI were equivalent to a
1611 climate forcing, warming in the pipeline would be the product of EEI and climate sensitivity ($^{\circ}\text{C}$
1612 per W/m^2), i.e., warming in the pipeline would be $\text{EEI} \times \text{ECS}/4$, where we have approximated the
1613 $2 \times \text{CO}_2$ forcing as $4 \text{ W}/\text{m}^2$.


1614 Fig. S6 shows the $2 \times \text{CO}_2$ results for the GISS (2014) and GISS (2020) GCMs. EEI is not a good
1615 measure of the warming in the pipeline, especially for the newer GISS model. The warming in
1616 the pipeline for the GISS (2014) model is typically $\sim 30\%$ larger than implied by EEI and $\sim 90\%$
1617 larger in the GISS (2020) model. If these results are realistic, they suggest that reduction of the
1618 human-made climate forcing by an amount equal to EEI will leave a planet that is still pumping
1619 heat into the ocean at a substantial rate.

1620 Real-world climate forcing is added year-by-year with much of the GHG growth in recent years,
1621 which Fig. 4 suggests will limit the discrepancy between actual warming in the pipeline and that
1622 inferred from EEI. Thus, we also make Green’s function calculations of global temperature and
1623 EEI for 1750-2019 for GHG plus IPCC aerosol forcings. Green’s function calculations are
1624 useful, with a caveat noted below, for quantities for which the response is proportional to the
1625 forcing. We calculate $T_G(t)$ using Eq. (4) and $\text{EEI}_G(t)$ using

1626
$$\text{EEI}_G(t) = \int [1 - R_{\text{EEI}}(t)] \times [dF(t)/dt] dt, \tag{S1}$$


1627 where R_{EEI} (Fig. 5b) is the EEI response function (% of equilibrium response) and dF is forcing
1628 change per unit time. Integrations begin in 1750, when we assume Earth was in energy balance.

1629 The results (Fig. S7) show that the excess warming in the pipeline (excess over expectations
1630 based on EEI) is reduced to 15-20% for the GISS (2014) model, but it is still 70-80% for the
1631 GISS (2020) model. This topic thus seems to warrant further examination, but it is beyond the
1632 scope of our present paper.



1633
 1634 Fig. S6. Ratio of warming in the pipeline to EEI, $(T_{eq} - T)/EEI$, for the first 300 years after
 1635 instant doubling of CO_2 for (a) GISS(2014) model and (b) GISS 2020 model.

1636 The first matter to investigate is the cause of the ultrafast response of EEI (Fig. 5 of the main
 1637 paper), which could be done via the model diagnostics discussed in that section of our paper. If
 1638 the large difference between the EEI response functions of the two GISS models is related to
 1639 supercooled cloud water, Fig. 1 of Kelley *et al.* (2020)³⁴ suggests that the real-world effect may
 1640 fall between that of the two models. If the higher climate sensitivity of the GISS (2020) model is
 1641 related to this cloud water phase problem, more realistic treatment of the latter may yield a
 1642 climate sensitivity between that of the 2014 and 2020 models.



1643
 1644 Fig. S7. Ratio of warming in the pipeline to EEI, $(T_{eq} - T_G)/EEI_G$, in response to GHG and
 1645 IPCC aerosol forcing for the period 1750-2019 using the response functions for the GISS (2014)
 1646 model (left) and (b) GISS (2020) model (right).


1647 If real world climate sensitivity for $2\times CO_2$ is near $4^\circ C$ or higher, as we have concluded, the total
 1648 cloud feedback is likely to be even higher than that of the GISS (2020) model. We suggest that it
 1649 would be useful to calculate response functions for other models, especially models with high
 1650 climate sensitivity, to help analyze feedbacks and to allow inexpensive climate simulations for
 1651 arbitrary forcing scenarios. One major caveat: we have used a single response function calculated
 1652 for $2\times CO_2$. Especially in view of cloud feedbacks, it seems likely that the response function for

1653 aerosol forcing is different from that for CO₂ forcing, because most tropospheric aerosols exist
1654 well below the clouds. Much might be learned from calculating response functions for GHGs,
1655 tropospheric aerosols, stratospheric aerosols, and solar irradiance, for example.

1656 The response functions for global temperature and EEI, for both the 2014 and 2020 models,
1657 smoothed and unsmoothed, are available at <http://www.columbia.edu/~mhs119/ResponseFunctionTables/>


1658 **SM7. $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ data of Zachos and Westerhold and inferred sea level and T_{do}**

1659 Zachos and Westerhold $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ for the full Cenozoic, the Pleistocene, and past 800 thousand years
1660 are shown in Fig. S8, as well as the inferred sea level and T_{do} (sea level is compared to data of
1661 Rohling *et al.*¹⁰³).




1662

1663



1664 Fig. S8. Zachos and Westerhold $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ and inferred sea level and T_{do} for the full Cenozoic, the
 1665 Pleistocene, and the past 800 thousand years. Sea level data are from Rohling *et al.*¹⁰³
 1666



1667 Fig. S9. Surface temperature inferred from Zachos $\delta^{18}\text{O}$.
 1668

1669 **SM8. Global warming in the pipeline: Green's function calculations**

1670 Surface temperature (Fig. S9) from equations (14) and (15) using Zachos $\delta^{18}\text{O}$. Antarctic Dome
 1671 C temperatures⁴³ (red) relative to last 1,000 years are multiplied by 0.6 to account for polar
 1672 amplification and 14°C is added for absolute scale.

1673 **SM9. Communications from James Zachos and Thomas Westerhold**

1674 Following is the 3 February 2023 response by Jim Zachos to a query by the first author (JEH) re
1675 Zachos' interpretation of the differences between the Westerhold and Zachos $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ data sets:

1676 There are two contributing factors that I am aware of. Because I was just stacking/averaging
1677 data across sites/basins, the only adjustment applied was for species vital effects (typically
1678 $<0.5\%$), in order to adjust to the "equilibrium" calcite values.

1679 The Westerhold curve/splice required adjusting each splice to the one above based on the overlap
1680 offset (+/-) between records (from different basins). Because this would be repeated with each
1681 splice, the effect is cumulative further back in time (see the [Westerhold] paper for the overlap
1682 adjustments). In the end, the thought was that the overlap adjustments would balance out.

1683 The PETM signal is large because the splice used for that interval was that of Site 1263, Walvis
1684 Ridge, which has an unusually large $d18\text{O}$ anomaly, almost double that of other pelagic sites.
1685 Why? Because it was relatively shallow (<1 km) and thus is capturing a shallow intermediate
1686 water signal which could be locally amplified with the introduction of warmer more saline
1687 waters (from a lower latitude source).

1688 The long-term T patterns and even with the orbital cycles are generally similar throughout the
1689 deep sea, but there are T gradients and thus regional differences in absolute T. This is the
1690 limitation of the mega splice for estimating mean ocean T.

1691 Following are relevant excerpts (lightly edited for clarity) of a 2 June 2023 response of Thomas
1692 Westerhold to questions by the first author (JEH). First question: whether the Zachos data are
1693 more globally distributed and thus reflect more Antarctic Bottom Water conditions, while
1694 Westerhold data put more weight on North Atlantic Deep Water:

1695 Please look at Sampling Biases in the supplement:⁹⁸ For the 66 to 45 Ma part, it is interesting to
1696 note that $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ records from the Pacific Shatsky Rise Site 12209 and the Atlantic Walvis Ridge
1697 Sites 1262/1263 show a consistent pattern. The benthic record is a good monitor for the higher
1698 latitude temperature development, assuming that most deep water is formed in the high latitudes.
1699 Thus, it will be biased towards "polar" changes.

1700 Figure S13⁹⁸ gives a good idea how the "raw" data look before adjusting. For stitching the curve
1701 together, we had to correct for the isotopic offsets from different ocean basins. The Pacific
1702 Ocean is the largest ocean and probably best resembles a global mean, therefore all data were
1703 offset with respect to the equatorial Pacific values (Sites 1218, U1337, U1338; Fig. S14). One
1704 has to realize that single, continuous, individual high-resolution records for each of the different
1705 ocean basins and spanning the entire Cenozoic are unrealistic due to local sedimentation effects
1706 (gaps and condensed intervals) in available deep-sea sections.

1707 We took the Ceara Rise benthic stack of Wilkens et al. (2017) that stacks available data and is on
1708 an age model independent from isotope tuning. To compensate, the Ceara record as given in
1709 Table S33 was corrected $\delta^{18}\text{O} +0.45$ per mil; $\delta^{13}\text{C} -1.00$ per mil, Fig. S15, to make it consistent
1710 with U1337 from the equatorial Pacific.

1711 The Zachos data from EECO are a mix of high latitude data (Kerguelen Plateau, Maude Rise),
1712 mid latitude South Atlantic Walvis Ridge data and equatorial Pacific data (865 and 577), and
1713 Indian Ocean. The EECO data for CENOGRID come from Walvis Ridge Southeast Atlantic and
1714 Equatorial Atlantic Demerara Rise. Compared to Equatorial Pacific, those $\delta^{18}\text{O}$ are very similar
1715 (graph provided). Thus, I think the CENOGRID is a good general deep sea temperature indicator
1716 for the EECO.

1717 Zachos data are generally isotopically heavier, which could be because it is “old” data. We know
1718 for example that using a common acid bath is not so good to have reliable data for $\delta^{18}\text{O}$; those
1719 data are from Shackleton, for example. Since the use of Kiel devices, this issue is solved.

1720 Second question: whether a greater weight on North Atlantic Deep Water (which, more reliably
1721 than Antarctic Bottom Water, includes polar amplification of temperature change) may make the
1722 Westerhold data yield a more realistic estimate of Cenozoic temperature change?

1723 It is more realistic because the data are of much better quality using modern analytical
1724 techniques, however we do not know how much is ice volume and salinity effect, and pH change
1725 in the deep sea. Nele Meckler *et al.* (2022) just published a paper²¹⁹ suggesting that temperature
1726 could be even higher in the deep ocean than given by $\delta^{18}\text{O}$.

1727 **DATA AVAILABILITY**

1728 "The data used to create the figures in this paper are available in the Zenodo repository,
1729 at [https://dx.doi.org/\[doi\]](https://dx.doi.org/[doi])."

1730 **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

1731 We thank Eelco Rohling for inviting JEH to describe our perspective on global climate response
1732 to human-made forcing. JEH began to write a review of past work, but a paper on the LGM by
1733 Jessica Tierney *et al.*⁵³ and data on changing ship emissions provided by Leon Simons led to the
1734 need for new analyses and division of the paper into two parts. We thank Jessica also for helpful
1735 advice on other related research papers and Ed Dlugokencky of the NOAA Earth System
1736 Research Laboratory for continually updated GHG data. JEH designed the study and carried out
1737 the research with help of Makiko Sato and Isabelle Sangha; Larissa Nazarenko provided data
1738 from GISS models and helped with analysis; Leon Simons provided ship emission information
1739 and aided interpretations; Norman Loeb and Karina von Schuckmann provided EEI data and
1740 insight about implications; Matthew Osman provided paleoclimate data and an insightful review
1741 of the entire paper; Qinjian Jin provided simulations of atmospheric sulfate and interpretations;
1742 Eunbi Jeong reviewed multiple drafts and advised on presentation; all authors contributed to our
1743 research summarized in the paper and reviewed and commented on the manuscript.

1744 All authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest. Climate Science, Awareness and
1745 Solutions, which is directed by JEH and supports MS and PK is a 501(C3) non-profit supported
1746 100% by public donations. Principal supporters in the past few years have been the Grantham
1747 Foundation, Frank Batten, Carl Page, James and Krisann Miller, Ian Cumming, Eric Lemelson,
1748 Peter Joseph, Gary and Claire Russell, Donald and Jeanne Keith Ferris, Aleksandar Totic, Chris
1749 Arndt, Jeffrey Miller, Morris Bradley and about 150 more contributors to annual appeals.

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- ¹ Tyndall J. [On the absorption and radiation of heat by gases and vapours](#). *Phil Mag* 1861;**22**:169-194, 273-285
- ² Hansen J. [Greenhouse giants](#), Chapter 15 in *Sophie's Planet*. New York: Bloomsbury, 1-8, 2023. Tyndall and Svante Arrhenius in the 1890s made the greatest early contributions to understanding of the greenhouse effect. Eunice Foote earlier did experiments to investigate the effect of individual gases on absorption of solar radiation and speculated on the role of CO₂ in altering Earth's temperature; Tyndall showed that the greenhouse effect is due to absorption of infrared radiation. Draft Chapters 10 (Runaway Greenhouse), 15, 16 (Farmers' Forecast vs End-of-Century) and 17 (Charney's Puzzle: How Sensitive is Earth?) are available [here](#); criticisms are welcome.
- ³ Revelle R, Broecker W, Craig H *et al.* [Appendix Y4 Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide](#). In: President's Science Advisory Committee. *Restoring the Quality of Our Environment*. Washington: The White House, 1965,111-33
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